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KAISER-FRAZER v. OTIS: A LEGAL

AND MORAL ANALYSIS
DAVID C. BAYNE) S.J.

T

IS

an unusual day in the financial and legal community when

an underwriter terminates a contract on the day of closing. It is
perhaps an even more unusual day when the esteemed Second
Circuit, reversing the District Court, upholds that underwriter in
its untoward and almost unparalleled action. Kaiser-Frazerv.. Otis'
is an unprecedented case. The law is not particularly new, but the
peculiar juxtaposition of the facts against the law is startlingly new.
The public interest in the Otis case is great. The alarming stabilization, the unexpected termination of the agreement, the controverted
Masterson case, long months of SEC investigation of Otis' activities,
registrat;on revocation proceedings, NASD suspension of Otis, the
inception of the Kaiser-Frazer litigation, the bankruptcy of Otis &
Co., the secret investigation of the SEC by the Heller Committee,
and finally the reversal by the Court of Appeals have all attracted
national notice. But there is much more behind the Otis case than
mere public appeal. It is a singularly important case from many farreaching aspects.
Otis represents a strong reaffirmation of the inviolability of the
American courts. In the face of an unhesitating lower court, a strong
public opinion flamed by months of SEC hearings and investigation,
1 195 F. 2d 838 (C.A. 2d, 1952). Argued before Augustus N. Hand and Clark, Circuit
Judges, and Brennan, District Judge Hand, C. J. delivered the unanimous opinion of
the Court.
FR. BAYNE received his A.B., 1939, University of Detroit; M.A., 1946, Loyola University of Chicago; LL.B., 1947, LL.M., 1948, Georgetown University School of Law;
S.J.D., 1949, Yale Law School. He is a member of the District of Columbia and
Federal Bars.
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with apparently every emotional reason to affirm the $3,000,000.00
Kaiser-Frazer judgment, the Court of Appeals reasoned to a strong,
unbiased reversal.
Otis epitomizes the legislative protection to the public investor.
In Otis the courts have restated with new authority the vigor of the
disclosure provisions of the Securities acts. In such an inconspicuous
and apparently trivial thing as a footnote can lie the difference between honest disclosure and material misrepresentation.
Otis stands as a fine testament of the clear logic and sound moral
principles of the Court. In this day when the pragmatist and legal
realist is basing his actions on expediency and shifting relativism, it
is a milestone when such fundamental principles as underlie Otis are
reasserted. In this day when natural law is contemned on many sides,
it is a refreshing thing to be able to point to such a clearly reasoned
instance of the natural law in action and application.
This is the broad ideological attitude we might take in beginning
a study of Otis, in placing the case in its full perspective in our
times. It is not good to do otherwise. Our days are fraught with too
many pitfalls for our nation's future for any thinking man, especially
a lawyer, to approach a socio-moral-legal problem out of the context
of our total national milieu and isolated from the broad conflicts
within our nation. The onus is great on the lawyer to approach every
development in his field from the aspect of the social physician,
from the viewpoint even of the moral theologian.
The consideration of the Otis case will proceed in three parts:
(I) The Facts, in detail. (II) The Solution, which will present the
thesis of the commentary, and outline the burden the treatment will
attempt to carry. (III) The Legal and Moral Analysis, which is the
body of the article and the proof of the thesis.
PART

I-THE

FACTS

The central action, in a complicated network of litigation 2 involving Kaiser-Frazer Corporation and Otis & Company,3 began with a
2Exclusive of the parent case there are four broad areas of litigation: (1) A series
of stockholders' derivative actions, charging in general breach of trust, fraud, and collusion: Masterson v. Kaiser-Frazer, Otis & Co., et al. in the Circuit Court for Wayne
County, Michigan, on February 9, 1948; Stella v. Kaiser-Frazer Corp., 81 F. 2d 807
(S.D. N.Y., 1948); Pergament v. Kaiser-Frazer, et al., 93 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Mich.,
1950); Lefker v. Kaiser-Frazer et al., D.C., Del., June 30, 1948; Otis & Co. v. Kaiser3 Kaiser-Frazer Corp. is a Nevada corporation; Otis & Co. a Delaware corporation
qualified to do business in New York.
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judgment entered on July 10, 1951, by the District Court for the
Southern District of New York, Clancy, J., sitting without a jury,
in the amount of $3,120,743.51 in favor of Kaiser-Frazer
in an action
4
contract.
underwriting
an
of
breach
for
for damages
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, reversed and
remanded with orders to enter judgment for Otis. Kaiser-Frazer
filed its Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court of
the United States on June 12, 1952.' On October 20, 1952 the Petition was denied.6
Early Antecedents
Kaiser-Frazer was organized in August, 1945, and had virtually no
production during that year, nor in early 1946. By the end of 1946
production increased, reaching volume in the spring of 1947. Otis
& Co. had successfully handled two previous flotations for KaiserFrazer,7 first at its inception and again in January, 1946. The issue
which was the subject of the contract under litigation was contemplated for very early in 1948. Although the automotive industry
Frazer, et al., D.C., Del.; Fleming v. Kaiser-Frazer, et al., July 9, 1948, state court of
California; (2) Three actions involving the Securities and Exchange Commission and
Otis & Co.: S.E.C. v. Otis & Co. et al., Civil Action No. 28371, D.C., N.D., Ohio, E.D.,
a statutory injunction suit. In the Matter of Otis & Co., United States of America,
before the S. E. C., an administrative proceeding in which the S. E. C. was examining
the conduct of Otis to determine whether Otis' registration as a broker and dealer
should be revoked. Otis & Co. v. National Association of Securities Dealers, S. E. C.,
DDC. No. 329-49; (3) Action by. the S. E. C. in the matter of collusion in the Masterson Case:, S. E. C. v. Harrison, 80 F. Supp. 226 (D. Ct. D.C., 1948); (4) A bankruptcy
roceeding by Otis: In re Otis & Co., 104 F. Supp. 201 (E.D. Ohio, 1952). The unpubished account of the Congressional hearings in connection with the activities of Otis
& Co. is in General Docket, Kaiser-Frazer Corporation Docket, File 4-15-1-2, Docket
Section, Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, D.C.; Study of S.E.C.,
82nd Cong., Final Report of S. E. C. Subcommittee to Committee on Interstate &
Foreign Com. G.P.O. (1952).
4 The action was originally begun on February 13, 1948, in the Supreme Court of the
State of New York and removed to the District Court for the Southern District of
New York on diversity of citizenship. This opinion was not reported and appears
in the Briefs and Records for the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit,
Vol. V., Exhibits, at 3057, and in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Appendix "A,"
in the Supreme Court of the United States, October Term, 1952, No. 123, KaiserFrazer Corp. v. Otis & Co.
5 Brief of Respondent in Opposition was filed on August 1, 1952.
6 73 S. Ct. 89. Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Clark took no part in the consideration of this application.
7 The same group of three underwriters, headed by Otis, made the three offerings,
First California Company, a California corporation, Allen & Co., a New York partnership, and Otis. The first issue in September, 1945 was sold to the public at $10.00 per
share in the amount of $17,000,000.00. In January, 1946, the second issue sold at $20.25
in the amount of $36,000,000.00.
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overall was enjoying a strong sellers' market, Kaiser-Frazer was yet
a fledgling and by no means safely established in the field. Until the
early months of 1947 production was limited to two medium priced
models-the Kaiser and Frazer. Losses for 1946 were over $19,000,000.00; for the first quarter of 1947, over $3,000,000.00. Kaiser-Frazer had paid no dividends since organization.
The first overture for the third flotation came in May, 1947, when
Edgar Kaiser approached Otis. Kaiser was told that a public offering
was inadvisable until a more substantial earnings record could be
shown. Later, on December 20, 1947, Henry and Edgar Kaiser telephoned William R. Daley, president of Otis, and advised him that the
firm had been making excellent profits and wished to begin the issue.
By January 6, 1948, Kaiser-Frazer filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission a Registration Statement for the issue of 1,500,000 shares of common stock. Before the statement could become effective, however, Kaiser-Frazer stock dropped from 14 to 114 on
January 26, and the issue was postponed by Kaiser-Frazer. This delay
resulted in amendment of the Registration Statement and the accompanying Prospectus. Whereas the earnings record had previously
been carried up to and including the month of November, it was
now extended to year-end. The issue was contemplated for February.8
The Contract
Meetings between Kaiser-Frazer and Otis were resumed on January 30, and again on February 2, and 3. The stock had fluctuated on
the market over this period reaching a 14 high. On February 3, it was
13 . On February 3, agreement was reached and the contract in writing was signed in New York City. The three underwriters were to
take 900,000 shares at $11.50 per share, with $1.00 to the brokers, and
sale to the public at $13.00. It was a several agreement, 337,500 shares
going to Otis and First California and 225,000 going to Allen.
Although there was evidence of hesitation on the part of Otis in going
forward with the issue,' the contract was signed at 5:30 P.M. on February 3, and the attorneys for Kaiser-Frazer appended a rider to the
8Strictly, Kaiser-Frazer was not required to list earnings to year-end, as the Brief
for Appellant, Otis, states at page 13. The Commission requires the earnings record
up to ninety days prior to the issue, which would mean November was the last required month.
9 Record, United States Court of Appeals, For the Second Circuit, Vol. III, page
1428. Henceforward this record will be cited:-R., III, 1428.
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front of the Prospectus (there were some last minute changes in detail, principally the reduction of the issue from 1,500,000 to 900,000
shares) and the SEC immediately made the Registration Statement
effective on that same late afternoon.
The contract, which provided that Kaiser-Frazer was to deliver,
and Otis to pay for, the 900,000 shares of common stock (February
9, 1948, was the closing date), carried several conditions to perform
ance by Otis. The principal conditions relevant to the litigation were
attached to the accuracy of and compliance with the following two
warranties and representations: (1) That the Registration Statement
(including the Prospectus) would fully comply with the Act and the
Regulations of the SEC and contain neither a material misrepresentation nor non-disclosure. (2) That Kaiser-Frazer's counsel was to deliver an opinion satisfactory to Otis' counsel that there were no material legal proceedings pending against the issuer.10
The Registration Statement and Prospectus
At the base of the entire Otis litigation, first from the factual standpoint and later from the legal, lie the Prospectus and the statements
and figures contained therein on page 7. Except for deletions of nonpertinent matter, the following is the exact reproduction of the relevant parts of page 7:
SUMMARY OF CONSOLIDATED SALES AND EARNINGS
The following summary reflects consolidated sales and earnings of the
Corporation from its inception to December 31, 1947. The information for the
period ended December 31, 1945, and the year ended December 31, 1946, as
shown in the table, and for the six months ended June 30, 1947, (as explained
in note 2) has been prepared from profit and loss statements examined by
Touche, Niven, Bailey & Smart and should be read in conjunction with the
financial statements for such periods included herein and the accountants'
10 The Contract reads: "Section 1. Representations and Warranties by the Company. The Company represents and warrants that:
(c) When the Registration Statement becomes effective, the Registration Statement and the Prospectus will fully comply with the provisions of the Act, and the
rules and regulations and instructions of the Commission thereunder; and neither
win contain any untrue statement of a material fact nor omit to state any
material fact ...
(f) There are no suits pending or . . . threatened against the Company which
affect any substantial portion of its property or ... business .. ." R., I, 14, 15.
Section 3. Conditions of Underwriters' Obligation. The obligations . . . of the

Underwriters to purchase ... the Shares shall be subject to the accuracy of and
compliance with the representations and warranties of the Company contained in
Section 1 hereof . . ." R., 1, 20. See also:-Sec. I(e), R., I, 15; Sec. 3(e), R, I, 23;
Sec. 3(b) (vi), R., 1, 20-22.
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report thereon. The information shown in the table for the eleven months
ended November 30, 1947, and the breakdown into the three fiscal quarters
and the two months period comprising such eleven months, has been taken
from profit and loss statements prepared by the Corporation from its books
and accounts, without audit, and should be read in conjunction with the unaudited eleven months financial statements and schedule included herein. The
tentative information shown in the table for the quarter and for the year
ended December 31, 1947, has been prepared by the Corporation from its
books and records, without audit, on the basis of a preliminary 1947 closing
made at January 23, 1948.

Period

Sales and
Miscellaneous
Income

From August 9 to
10,979
December 31,1945. S
Year ended Dec. 31,
11,657,972
1946 .............
Elvcn months ended November 30,
1947 ............ 227,560,032
Quarter ended
March 31, 1947
27,305,035
(2) ...........
Quarter ended
June 30, 1947
(2) ........... 53,142,946
Quarter ended
78,527,735
Sept. 30, 1947..
Two months end68,584,316
ed Nov. 30, 1947
Quarter ended Dec.
31, 1947(4) ...... 101,999,563
Year ended Dec. 31,
260,975,279
1947 (4) .........

Cost of
Sales

$

Selling and
Administrative
Expenses

Other
Deductions
or Credits*
-Net

Net Profit
or Loss*

224,607

$ 551,988

S 7,104 $

28,092,530

2,940,877

90,754*

204,674,595

6,751,960

637,729

29,366,660

1,093,542

81,127

3,236,294" (1)

50,255,274

1,640,776

198,641

1,048,255(1)

67,890,777

2,150,261

209,388

8,277,309(1)

57,161,884

1,867,381

148,573

9,406,478(1)

84,519,665

3,850,916

213,121

13,415,861 (1)

232,032,376

8,735,495

702,277

19,505,131 (1)

772,720*
19,284,68115,495,748

Notes:
(4) The tentative information for the quarter and year ended December 31, 1947,
reflects various substantial year end adjustments including provision for certain reserves and a material increase in inventories to conform to the results of the complete physical inventory taken by the Corporation as of l)ecember 31, 1947.11

The Prospectus is prepared from figures contained in the Registration
Statement.
The Offering
On February 3, the market closed at 13-2 and on the 4th Otis
solicited its brokers. The market was poor. By 1:00 P.M. the offering

was terminated with approximately half of the shares unsold. On that
same day overtures were made by First California and Otis to cancel
the issue. Cyrus Eaton, for Otis, pointed out that a forced sale could
11 Prospectus, 1,500,000 Shares, Kaiser-Frazer Corporation, Commn Stock, dated
February 3, 1947, 33 pages. Reproduced in the essential part (page 7), in the Brief
for Appellant, United States Court of Appeals, Appendix A, at page 67.
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be disastrous, that it would "end up with hell-a-poppin'."'1 2 These
suggestions were rejected by Kaiser-Frazer.
During the period from February 4, to 9, many attempts were made

on the part of Otis and First California to modify the arrangements,
but without avail. Kaiser-Frazer stock remained at a figure below the
intended offering price. 13 The brief for Otis in the Court of Appeals
states that Otis was at that time "exploring its legal defenses with
counsel."' 4
On the date of closing in Cleveland, the proceedings and discussions were protracted throughout the day. Otis finally rejected the
opinion of Kaiser-Frazer counsel that there was no outstanding litigation against the corporation and refused to accept the proffered stock.
Word had come from the press that a certain James F. Masterson, a
Philadelphia attorney and shareholder in Kaiser-Frazer, had that
morning at 9:30 initiated a shareholders' derivative suit in the courts
of Wayne County, Michigan. 5 Masterson asked for an injunction
restraining the issue by Otis, and for an accounting of profits from
certain allegedly inside and improper operations. First California
joined Otis in rejecting counsel's opinion. Allen remained ready to
perform. Otis and First California served notices of termination of
their obligation under the contract.1 6 There was no evidence that
Kaiser-Frazer had not come prepared to perform.
The District Court
Kaiser-Frazer came into the District Court with three major allegations:' 7 (1) Otis was guilty of a breach for failing to accept and pay
R., 1, 329-32; IV, 2016-21.
Kaiser-Frazer stock, onl the New York Curb Exchange, dropped to a low of
21. The value as of April 1, 1953 was 51 per share.
14 Brief for Appellant, 18; R., 1, 450, 405, 437-8.
15 This case is discussed infra, p. 139.
16 Otis explains the reason for refusal: "Between February 4 and the closing date,
February 9, Otis and First California separately proposed various formulas for
settlement of the controversy (R. 356, 563-65, 405 et seq., 1446-,7, 1488-89). Otis
offered to prove that during this period it had begun to check the information
received by its salesmen from Kaiser-Frazer dealers, and although in the brief time
available its investigation could not be concluded, it believed that the Company
had misrepresented and concealed essential facts from the underwriters-a belief
which was completely justified as the facts in this record now show (R. 1434).
These facts were peculiarly of a nature to be reflected in the attitude of the general public who were prospective purchasers of the securities. They related to the
adverse consumer attitude and dealer position with respect to the Company's cars,
particularly the high-priced models." Brief for Appellant, 17.
17These are set out indirectly in the Court's opinion at R., V., 3072. See also
195 F. 2d 838, 839, 840 (C.A. 2d, 1952).
12

13
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for the stock. Kaiser-Frazer asked total and special damages in the
amount of $17,419,819.00 arising out of manufacturing profits lost due
to the unavailability of the capital expected from the issue; (2) Otis
had collusively inspired the Masterson suit and thereby repudiated the
contract without excuse; (3) Otis had induced First California to
breach, and was liable in damages therefor.
Otis answered with two major (and several lesser) affirmative defenses: that it was relieved of any obligation by (1) the Masterson
suit, and, (2) breach of the warranty (and hence of the condition
precedent to performance) that the Registration Statement and
Prospectus would contain neither misrepresentation nor non-disclosure of a material fact. Otis claimed, as the District Court put it, that
the "earning summary in the prospectus gave a false impression,"' 8
and hence misled both Otis and the public.
18 Opinion of the District Court, R., V, 3076. Otis did, in fact, found its case in
the matter of the alleged non-disclosure and misrepresentation on two distinct
instances: (1) the December earnings figure, and, (2) the non-recurring profits
realized from the sale of two special models, the Manhattan and the Custom. In
its briefs for both the District and Circuit Courts, Otis placed almost equal stress
on the two instances, but when the Circuit Court relied solely on the December
earnings for its decision, Otis henceforward concentrated on this point. Space limitations make it advisable to confine consideration of the non-recurring profits from
the Manhattan and Custom models to the footnotes.
Faced with $23,000,000.00 in losses to March, 1947, Kaiser-Frazer endeavored to tap
the sellers' (R. V, 2920, 2928, 2930) market in the higher price range. Two new
models were introduced, in the Buick price field, first the Frazer Manhattan and
later the Kaiser Custom. Both cars were differentiated from the regular models only
in price, which ranged up to $500.00 higher, and in trim and upholstery, but not
otherwise. R., III, 1337; IV, 1951.
By May, 1947 the Company showed profits. During August to December, 1947
68% of Kaiser-Frazer profits were due to the Manhattans and Customs. R., V, 2760.
Over this period, however, the sale of these models gradually decreased:% of Manhattans and Customs
to Total Cars Sold
O ctober .......................... 50%
N ovember ........................ 39%
December ........................ 32%
January .......................... 17%
Concurrent with this drop, the Company cut production from 50% of total output
to less than 20% by the date of the Prospectus. Projected production, moreover,
was set at 16% for the five months following the date of the Prospectus. R., V,
2760, 2777, 2754, 2766-67. Otis pointed out that cessation of this profit explained the
drop in December earnings, but that cause for the drop, and the non-recurrent nature
of the profits, were not disclosed in the Prospectus or the Registration Statement, nor
to Otis itself. R., II, 1509-11, 1515, 1603, 1602. The Prospectus on this point reads:
"Both the Kaiser Custom and the Frazer Manhattan are in the high priced automobile field. .*. . The public has since the inception of production by the Corporation
and is at the present time purchasing high priced automobiles in numbers much
greater than was the case prior to the last war. The Corporation is, of course, not
m any position to predict how long this condition will continue." Prospectus, 5.
The District Court treats this matter in its opinion at R., V, 3076-9. It concurred
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The Opinion of the District Court
The Court made findings of fact in some thirty paragraphs. It
placed considerable stress on the numerous attempts by Otis to modify the arrangements for the issue, and entered into detail in depicting
the steps leading to the termination of the contract by Otis in Cleveland, reiterating that "the only ground assigned ... was the pendency
of the Masterson suit."19
Beyond these findings there were three areas in which the District
Court drew important conclusions from the facts: (1) that Cyrus
Eaton had determined as early as February 5, that Otis would not
perform under the contract; (2) that the Masterson suit ". . . was
instituted as a result of a plot to establish an excuse to breach the contract conceived by Eaton, approved by Daley, and executed by
Bulkley who procured Masterson as a dummy plaintiff and Harrison
who supplied Martin as the Attorney;" 20 (3) "that the summary of
consolidated sales and earnings for the final quarter of the year 1947,
set forth on page 7 of the prospectus, was computed in accordance
21
with accepted accounting procedures."
Building on these factual conclusions, the Court arrived at three
conclusions of law: (1) Otis, by repudiation or termination, breached
the contract and was liable in damages; (2) Otis may not avail itself
of the Masterson suit which Otis itself collusively procured; (3)
thereby caused the breach by First California and was liable therefore
in damages.
The Masterson Case
The District Court, in addition to the consideration already given
in its findings of fact, devoted further attention to the vexing question
of the collusive nature of the shareholders' derivative action begun in
in the facts (R., V, 3067-68) but found that there had been sufficient disclosure:
"It is for all these reasons we have found there was no prospect of untoward sales
conditions that required revelation in the prospectus to make it honest. The pro-

spectus truthfully described the company's sales policy and its competitive position."
R., V, 3089. The brief for Kaiser-Frazer argued the question-pages 35 through 38;
the brief for Otis-pages 24 through 30; in Otis' Reply Brief-pages 2 through 9.

19 Opinion of the District Court, R., V, 3062.
20 Opinion of the District Court, R., V, 3065. The Court occupies itself with establishing this fact in detail through paragraphs 14 to 30 inclusive. Opinion, R., V,
3063-67.
21 Opinion of the District Court, R., V, 3068. The question of damages perforce
occupied much of the Court's time but is obiter to this study, although it presents
some interesting legal problems.

14U
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Detroit. The problem is fascinating, has occupied the SEC, many
courts and many attorneys, but can be, and should be, pretermitted in
this study. 2 .
The Earnings Summary in the Prospectus
Clearly a focal point in the Otis case -is the question of full disclosure or misrepresentation of the earnings record on pag6 7 of the
Prospectus. The District Court begin its discussion by quoting the
definition of a material fact from the rules of the Commission: Any
matter "... . as to which an average prudent investor ought 2reasonably
8
to be informed before purchasing the security registered.
The Court faced the question squarely, asserting the allegations of
Otis: "Defendant complains that the summary of earnings on page 7
of the prospectus was misleading in that it indirectly showed that the
earnings for December 1947, were approximately $4,000,000.00 when
as a fact, upon reallocation of the year-end adjustments, the earnings
were only a little over $600,000.00.' 24 The Court responded to these
allegations:
We have found that 'the summary of earnings on page 7 was not misleading
but even assuming, for the purposes of discussion, that the year-end adjustments should have been reallocated to the prior months, consistency would
In that case, as
require a complete reallocation of all elements of costs ....
the testimony and exhibits of Hollis indicate, the earnings of December, 1947,
would have approximated $2,865,525.00. . . .. The question is reduced to a
choice between two different systems of accounting. Under either the systems actually used by the plaintiff or that proposed by the defendant, if that
of earnings
were applied consistently to all elements of costs, the summary
25
on page 7 of the prospectus does not distort the realities.

This was the only adversion of the District Court to this point.
The Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals by-passed the several assigned errors and
founded its decision on one point alone: Whether the District Court
22

Whereas the instant Court found that it "was proved beyond a reasonable
doubt" (R., V, 3074) that the Masterson suit was instituted through Otis, and its
agents, the District Court for the District of Columbia held, on substantially the
same evidence, that the facts did not establish even "prima facie" that Otis had instigated the action. S.E.C. v. Harrison, 80 F. Supp. 226 (D. Ct. D.C., 1948). In such
a situation the question must be treated as unsolved and the discussion proceed on
that basis.
23 SEC, General Rules and Regulations, Rule 405.
24 Opinion of the District Court, R., V, 3080.
25 Ibid.
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lqi

was correct in finding that Kaiser-Frazer had not misrepresented, but
had adequately disclosed, its profit for December? If there were such
a misrepresentation, Otis was under no obligation to accept the stock
and would have a complete defense to all causes of action.
Conclusions from the Facts
The Court stressed the speculative nature of the venture, the comparatively brief earnings record in the latter part of 1947, and the
importance to the investor of this record as the best and perhaps only
available indication of Kaiser-Frazer's ability to compete within an
established industry. It noted the contention of Otis that without a
favorable picture of earnings for that period the issue could not have
been made. The point was that Kaiser-Frazer did determine to appraise its investors of this record, and failure to make full disclosure of
all of the facts bearing on these earnings constituted a breach of the
contract, and violated the Securities Act of 1933 as well.2 1
There were nine important conclusions that were basic to the decision of the Court: (1) That although there was no December earnings figure as such, the average investor would subtract the twomonths period from the fourth quarter earnings and obtain a figure of
$4,000,000.00, "which one would naturally assume to represent the
profit of the Corporation for the single month of December, 1947; 27
(2) That even if December earnings were not misrepresented, the
fourth quarter total was excessive by $2,245,000.00 according to Kaiser-Frazer's own calculations; (3) December earnings were nowhere
near $4,000,000.00 but about $900,000.00; (4) The discrepancy was
due simply to the inclusion in the final quarter of $3,371,155.00 which
came from an increase over book figures of the physical inventory
taken in latter December, 1947; (5) This inventory increase was allocable not only to December and the last quarter, but to the entire
year and even in part to prior years; (6) Kaiser-Frazer's own "Consolidated Statement of Income and Expense" bears out these conclusions:
Net Profit or (Loss) for the
Month of December, 1947.. $ 638,226.97
Prior Months' Adjustment
(see notes) .............. 3,371,155.5628
195 F. 2d 838, 840 (C.A.2d, 1952).
Ibid., at 842.
28 Ibid. See R., V, 3096.
26
27
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(7) "Kaiser-Frazer's expert accountant did not deny that that inventory write-up should have been allocated to prior periods;" 29
(8) Even a complete reallocation of expenses charged to December,
as presented by Kaiser-Frazer's expert, would still result in overstatement of December earnings in the amount of $1,000,000.00; (9) But
such a reallocation is unacceptable as opposed to the accounting system in use by Kaiser-Frazer and on which the summary was based.
On these premises the Court held that it could not agree with the
District Court that the summary was prepared in accordance with
accepted accounting procedures and was not misleading.
For, regardless of whether its accounting system was a sound one, KaiserFrazer stated its earnings in such a way as to represent that it had made a
profit of about $4,000,000.00 in December, 1947. This representation was
$3,100,000.00 short of the truth. Concededly the profits for the year as a whole
were substantially unaffected by the overstatement of December earnings, but
the prospective purchaser was entitled to the full disclosure of all the facts
that were known to the Corporation at the time the prospectus was issued;
and the Corporation knew on February 3, 1948, that its profit for the month
of December 1947 was less than $1,000,000.00.30

The Court then adverted to the footnote used in explanation of the
inventory adjustments and concluded that it "was entirely insufficient
for this purpose. No one reading it would have been put on notice
that the actual profit for December was less than a fourth of what
'31
was indicated by the table.'
Factually, the Court stated, there was some indication that Otis was
at least informed of the actual December earnings and apparently
took part in the preparation of the Registration Statement and
Prospectus. 32
The Application of the Law
Onto these conclusions from the facts the Court superimposed the
governing legal principles, and moved to its ultimate conclusion
29 Kaiser-Frazer v. Otis & Co., 195 F. 2d 838, 843 (C.A. 2d, 1952). Charles M. Hollis
was vice-president and comptroller of Kaiser-Frazer at the time of the trial. The pre-

liminary figures included in the Prospectus at page 7 were prepared under his

direction. His capacity at that time was assistant comptroller. Hollis' testimony will
be treated more specifically infra.
30 "This is so regardless of the equities as between the parties for . . . the very
meaning of public policy is the interest of others than the parties and that interest

is not to be the mercy of the defendant alone." Kaiser-Frazer Corp. v. Otis & Co.,
195 F. 2d 838, 844 (C.A. 2d, 1952).
31 Ibid., at 843.
.32 Ibid. The question of Otis' knowledge will receive fuller consideration infra.
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through six well-reasoned stages: (1) the allegation is ill-founded
that possible full knowledge by Otis of all the facts prior to contracting bars reliance on such facts as constituting a breach of warranty,
since ". . . whatever the rules of estoppel or waiver may be in the
case of an ordinary contract of sale, nevertheless it is clear that a contract which violates the laws of the United States and contravenes
public policy as expressed in those laws is unenforceable; 33 (2) further support comes from the broad language of Section 14 of the
Securities Act of 193 334 which brushes aside ordinary contract principles of estoppel that might otherwise apply to contracts for securities;
(3) any sale to the public by the use of the Prospectus would have
been a violation of Section 12 (2) of the Act; (4) although the contract in itself involved only a sale to Otis, and such a sale would not
violate the Act, nevertheless we "...
are satisfied that the contract
was so closely related to the performance of acts forbidden by law as
to be itself illegal. 3 5 (This was merely the initial step in the public
offering that would necessarily follow.); (5) the Prospectus, found
to be misleading, formed an integral part of the contract; (6) the
public sale was to be made, and could only have been made, in reliance on that Prospectus (Section 5 (b) of the Act).
Therefore, the Court concludes, the contract was unenforceable.
Kaiser-Frazer was not entitled to recover damages, nor was Otis liable
for its influence on First California.
PART I1-SOLUTION

(1) Material misrepresentation and non-disclosure by KaiserFrazer (2) violated the duty to disclose under the Common Law, the
Securities Act of 1933, and the Contract itself, (3) and, as integral to
the whole underwriting agreement (4) and essentially looking to the
detriment of the public investor, (5) rendered the contract illegal, and
hence unenforceable, (6) notwithstanding alleged estoppel due to
Otis' knowledge.
33

Ibid.

The Court footnotes Section 14: "Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision
of this subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void."
15 USCA § 77n.
34

35 195 F. 2d 838, 844. The Court would seem to have nodded a bit in regard to
the inapplicability of the Act to sale to Otis alone. About this, infra.
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PART

III-THE

LEGAL AND MORAL ANALYSIS

The thesis laid out in Part 11: Solution will serve as a subject outline for the legal and moral commentary, will present for proof and
analysis the principal sub-theses on which the total solution rests, and
will trace the several steps to the ultimate adjudication: That the
contract was void, and hence unenforceable.
The Question of Non-Disclosure and Misrepresentation
"(I) Material misrepresentation and
non-disclosure ......
From Part 11:-Solution

In the earlier stages of the case, in the briefs before the District
Court and Court of Appeals, Otis alleged two major derelictions:
(1) The failure to disclose the non-recurrent profits from the Manhattan and Custom models, and (2) the non-disclosure and misrepresentation of December earnings. Confining the analysis to the December earnings,3 6 the approach will be with three questions:- (A) Was
30 A summary o inion on the question of the suppression of facts concerning the
non-recurrent proft s from the Manhattans and Customs would seem to indicate the
following points:-(1) The District Court found that over 68% of Kaiser-Frazer
profits for the five months ending November 30, 1947, were due to Manhattan and
Custom sales. R., V, 3067. (2) By February, 1948, only 20% of the profits were
coming from this source. R., V, 2760. (3) Contemporaneously these models accounted for 50% of all production in October and only 17% in January. R., V,
2754, 2760. (4) Kaiser-Frazer indicated its realization of the cessation of these profits
by cutting projected production of these models, by planning (in October, 1947)
75% for November to (in February) 18% for February and 13% for June. R., V,
2765. (5) Meanwhile the industry as a whole could not meet the demand (R., V,
3067, 3040; IV, 2291; 1I, 1597), nor was there a great seasonal fluctuation (Defendant's Exhibit 139, 140). (6) No matter what Kaiser-Frazer may have expected or
thought would compensate for the loss of these profits in other areas, the Prospectus
should have first informed of the non-recurrence of the earnings from these models.
It could have then informed the public of its hope of compensatory profits from
other sources, but that was another matter. The District Court, however, accepted
Kaiser-Frazer's argument and stated that no disclosure under these conditions was
necessary (R., V, 3077-8). "The law is settled that no amount of honest belief that
the enterprise would ultimately make money for the stockholders can excuse or
justify false representations . . ." in the sale of stock. Foshay v. United States, 68
F. 2d 205, 210 (C.A. 8th, 1933), cert. denied, 291 U.S. 674 (1934). The undisclosed
hope or belief in an alternative source of profit does not excuse a company offering
securities from disclosing that its statement of past profits is largely based on nonrecurring or greatly reduced sources of profits. See Rex v. Kytsant [1932] 1 K.B.
442. Appellant's Reply Brief, United States Court of Appeals, For the Second
Circuit. Kaiser-Frazer Corporation v. Otis & Co. As the expert witness for Otis
said:-". . . those facts, if known, would have completely negated the apparently
attractive profit trend as established in the information contained on page 7 of the
prospectus." Leston B. Nay, President of First Securities Company, Chicago, thirty
years in the securities business, who committed his firm to participate in the selling
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the alleged fact actually existent? (B) Was it concealed, or even misrepresented? (C) Was it material?
A. The Question of Fact
There is, to begin with, no dispute about the facts themselves, as
such. The facts are all garnered from the books and records of KaiserFrazer, from the court record, or from the findings of the District
Court. The first semblance of dispute comes in the analysis, the breakdown and disposition of the facts, in the conclusions, implications,
imputations, and inferences latent therein.
What, then, de facto, was the Kaiser-Frazer earnings record? The
situation through 1946 was clear. To this point Kaiser-Frazer had lost
approximately $20,000,000.00. The total figure for 1947 is also clear,
a net profit of $19,000,000.00, in spite of a $3,000,000.00 loss in the
first quarter. The focal point lies in the actual breakdown of the
1947 figures: (1) for the four quarters; (2) for the two months
ended November 30, and finally; (3) for the month of December
itself. For purposes of later discussion and fuller insight this last figure
must be determined, in spite of allegations by Kaiser-Frazer that it
did not appear in the Prospectus.
When pressed fully, there seems to be no actual dispute even about
the breakdown of these figures. Kaiser-Frazer admits both the figures
and the breakdowns underlying them. The District Court passed over
this phase of the question and only asked whether the amounts were
"material" and the representation "misleading"? 3 7 This would mean
that the crucial problem was not with the fact of the figures, but with
the consequent question:- Were these facts concealed? Or, if concealed, was the matter substantial and material? But the determination
of these three sets of figures still remains basic to a logical elucidation
of the manifold convolutions of the case.
The clarification that must be made concerns the nature and content of the three figures under question. Were these operating profits?
The average investor expects to see, in a Profit and Loss capitulation,
only those profits reaped from operations, and from the operations of
group of the Kaiser-Frazer stock. Testimony on Direct Examination, R., IV, 2126.
(7) This instance of non-disclosure is a strong complement to the non-disclosure
of December earnings, especially since, in addition to being an instance of non-disclosure in and of itself, it does go far to explain the sharp decline of earnings in
December and would logically, therefore, accompany an indication of that decline.
37 Opinion of the District Court, R., V, 3080, 3081.
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the period designated. The captions above each column in the Earnings Summary on page 7 of the Prospectus indicate that these figures
were representative of profit based on earnings from sales. This is the
usual meaning of "Sales and Miscellaneous Income," "Cost of Sales,"
"Selling and Administrative Expense," and "Net Profit and Loss."
There are seven main sources for the correct breakdown of these
three figures: (1) the Kaiser-Frazer Operating Report for December 1947;"s (2) the Prospectus; (3) the Summary of Year-End Adjustments,3 9 (4) the Write-Up of Inventory, December, 1947;40 (5)
the Kaiser-Frazer 10-K Report for 1947 filed with the SEC;41 (6) the

Schedule of Profit and Loss After 43Redistribution;4 2 (7) the Allocation of PriorMonths' Adjustments.
The Kaiser-Frazer Operating Report gives the base for the breakdown by separating operating profits from write-ups allocable to
other months:
Net Profit or (Loss) for the
Month of December, 1947. $ 638,226.97
Prior Months' Adjustments.... 3,371,155.56
This report was prepared by Kaiser-Frazer officials for use by KaiserFrazer officials.
These PriorMonths' Adjustments are then summarized by Hollis,
expert accountant witness for Kaiser-Frazer, in the Summary of

Year-End Adjustments:
8 Kaiser-Frazer Corporation, Consolidated Statement of Income and Expense (not
audited) For the Month of December, 1947, Exhibit D to Defendant's Exhibit 76,
R., IV, 2276. See Index, R., VI, XXVI.
9 Summary of Year-End Adjustments, Kaiser-Frazer Corporation and Subsidiaries,
December 31, 1947, Plaintiff's Exhibit 97, R., V, 2611.
40Write-up of Inventory as of December 31, 1947, Included in Preliminary
Figures Used in Prospectus, Defendant's Exhibit 63, R., V, 2800. This exhibit was
prepared by Harry M. Prevo, expert accountant witness for Otis, a certified public
accountant for 25 years, partner of White, Bower & Prevo, Chairman of the Michigan
State Board of Accountancy. Prevo's firn began an inspection of Kaiser-Frazer
books in February, 1949. R., III, 1241, 2.
41 Form 10-K For Corporations, Kaiser-Frazer Corporation, File 1-3340-2, Docket
Section, Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, D.C.
42 Schedule of Net Profit or Loss by Periods After Giving Effect to Redistribution
of Prior Month's Adjustments and Other Costs and Expenses Recorded in November, 1947, and December, 1947, to the Periods to Which They Apply, Plaintiff's
Exhibit 98, R., V, 2613.
43
Kaiser-Frazer Corporation, Allocation of Prior Months' Adjustments Included
in December, 1947, and Related Data, Defendant's Exhibit 81, R., V, 2818.
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SUMMARY OF YEAR-END ADJUSTMENTS
KAISER-FRAZER CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES
December 31, 1947
Profit for eleven months ended
November 30, 1947, as per
financial statements included
in registration statement ....
Addition for December before
year-end adjustments .......
Year-end adjustments:
Inventory:
Difference between physical inventories and book
inventories prior to pricing
adjustm ents ..............
$2,195,808.73
Inventory shrinkage reserves
1,552,481.43
not required .............
Repricing to reflect revised
614,656.33
standard costs ............
325,207.32
Repricing of sheet steel ......
Repricing of labor and bur164,415.91
den .....................
Vacation pay ................
Overriding discounts .........
Factory warranty and policy
adjustm ents ................
Cost variances on steel slabs furnished to rolling mills by
Portsmount Steel Corporation .......................
Bonus to nonunion employees..
Miscellaneous adjustments, each
less than $100,000.00 ........

$15,495,748.27
638,226.97

4,852,569.72
100,692.09
$ 120,000.00
780,202.93

207,599.93
332,173.53
142,129.86
$1,582,106.25

Profits for twelve months ended
December 31, 1947, as per
registration statement .......

$21,087,237.05
1,582,106.25

$19,505,130.8044

This summary again isolates the operating profit for December at
$638,226.97 and the adjustment figure for prior monthsat $3,371,155.56. But it does more. It begins to explain what footnote 4 on page
7 means when it says: ". . . reflects various substantial year end ad"justments including provision for certain reserves and a material in44 Since the figure for the year ended, after audit adjustments, comes to substantially the same figure ($19,015,677.96) reproduction of adjustments has been omitted
from the above summary.
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crease in inventories.. ." The figure of $1,582,106.25 is the total of
those year-end adjustments, the reserves, which operated to reduce
the total of December earnings. Subtracting this figure from the inventory adjustments, plus vacation pay ($4,852,569.72), gives the net
years-end adjustment ($3,371,155.56) which was added as an increase
to the operating profit ($638,226.97). When this was added to the
eleven months ended November 30, 1947 ($15,595,748.27), the result
was the total profit for the year ($19,505,130.80). These figures, taken
from the Kaiser-Frazer exhibit (and hence uncontroverted by them)
advance the breakdown considerably and leave only further identification of the five figures listed under the inventory adjustments and
totaling $4,852,569.72.
The Inventory Write-Up
The three repricing figures are self-explanatory and simply writeups of inventory based on higher values due to (1) standard costs,
$614,656.33; (2) increased value of sheet steel, $325,207.32; and (3)
labor and burden, $164,415.91. 45 These totalled $1.1 million.
A study of the Prospectus in comparison with the Kaiser-Frazer
Form 10-K (for the year 1947) explains the figure of inventory
shrinkage. On page 24 of the Prospectus the Consolidated Balance
Sheet for June 30, 1947, shows under Inventories a reserve of $955,264.89 for possible shrinkage. On page 26 the Consolidated Balance
Sheet for November 30, 1947, shows this reserve at $1,553,808.04.
The Prospectus did not give the Balance Sheet for December, 1947,
but reference to the 10-K Report gives the audited figures filed with
the Commission at year-end. In the 10-K Report the $1.5 million inventory reserve is missing. Comparison of the capitulation of inventory Note B of the Prospectus at page 30 with the exactly corresponding information in Form 10-K, at page F-6, shows no reserve at
all for shrinkage, one month after the figures in the Prospectus.
In tracing down this inventory shrinkage figure after its disappearance in the month between the Prospectus and the official and audited
10-K Report, the three possible destinations all indicate that this is the
figure appearing in the year-end adjustments under Profits. There is
no evidence that this reserve was (1) put into Surplus, as a check of
45

Recourse to the Write-up of Inventory prepared by Prevo shows that the
$614,656.33 was a write-up resulting from valuing the inventory (in contradistinction to merely re-counting the inventory) at 1949 standard prices rather than 1947
standard prices. The figure of $299,624.71 was a 30% markup in value of the steel
content of inventory. R., V, 2800, see note 40 supra.
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page F-5 of the 10-K Report will show, (2) returned to any balance
sheet reserve accounts (page F-3), or (3) netted against the inventory total shown in the December balance (had it been so done, it
would have appeared as it did in November and June, or should have
been so shown). There was, moreover, no footnote in the 10-K Balance Sheet notes indicating where the $1.5 million went.46 In short, if
it did not go into Profit and Loss, it had to appear elsewhere, but
does not. There seems little doubt, therefore, that the reserve set up
over the year 1947 for inventory shrinkage was lumped into Profits
and appeared in the following totals in the Prospectus: (1) The year
ended December 31, 1947; (2) The quarter ended December 31,
1947. But, and this is clearly as important as the figures in which this
amount did appear, it was not contained in any form, allocated or
otherwise; (1) in the first three quarters; (2) in the two months
ended November 30, 1947; (3) in the eleven months ended November 30, 1947.
This leaves one remaining figure unaccounted for, the $2,195,808.73 difference between physical and book inventory. The only explanation for such a figure is a straight write-up of inventory amount,
based not on increased value, but on the physical recount set against
the book figure. This fills out the $3.37 million over and above profits
from operation.
The Actual Earnings from Operations
The reasoning thus far has led to the conclusion that the $4,000,000.00 differential between the eleven months ended November, and
the year ended December, as shown in the Prospectus, consisted of two
elements: (1) $638,000.00 in operating profits, and (2) $3.3 million
inventory write-ups. The question now is this: - Where does this $3.3
million truthfully belong? Part of the answer has already been indicated in the reference to the fact that the Consolidated Balance Sheets
for June 30, 1947, and again for November 30, 1947, in the 10-K
Report showed the gradual growth of the reserve for possible inventory shrinkage. This growth would partially indicate the proration
for that segment of the total inventory write-up figure. But the full
answer must come from accountant experts who have studied the
Kaiser-Frazer books. Both Hollis for Kaiser-Frazer and Prevo for
Otis submitted schedules of distribution of the inventory write-ups
lumped into the fourth quarter.
46

Form 10-K For Corporations, at page F-6. See note 41 supra.
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Hollis, in his Schedule of Profit or Loss After Redistribution, made
a redistribution of the $3.3 million Prior Months' Adjustments, showing the net profit by months as follows:
September ........ $4,500,000
October .......... 6,100,000
November ........ 4,100,000
863,000
December ........
These figures were submitted by Hollis in his attempt to prove another point in the Kaiser-Frazer argument, 47 but it is to be noted here
that this information gained ex aliunde clearly shows that Hollis and
Kaiser-Frazer realized that the inventory write-ups should have been
allocated to the months in which they actually reduced the cost of
sales and hence increased the earnings from operations. 48 Hollis allocated the amount of $225,394.45 to the operating profits of $638,226.97. This figure is approximately the same as Prevo used in his
Allocation of Prior Months' Adjustments. Prevo produced the following monthly capitulation of profits after distribution of the $3.3
million:
September ......... $4,400,000
October .......... 6,100,000
November ........ 4,000,000
900,000
December ........
Comparison of this schedule with that of Hollis leaves little doubt
about the approximate proration, or, more important, the reasonableness of proration itself.
It must be said very clearly, as Prevo admitted, that there is no
complete information as to exactly the correct redistribution of the
inventory write-ups. "We didn't get there until over a year after the
inventory was taken."4 9 This, of course, was not true of Hollis. 50
47 1Hollis submitted a completely alternative plan in explanation of the December
earnings figure of $4 million, not by way of explaining what actually appeared in the
Prospectus, nor of justifying the Summary of Earnings, but in order to show that
if another, and completely different, approach to the whole accounting situation had
been used, the result would have still been to list December "earnings" at about the
same figure. However, it remained as the Circuit Court says, that ".

.

. the amount of

the overstatement of December earnings was . . . over $1,000,000.00." 195 F. 2d 838,
843 (C.A. 2d, 1952).
48 The allocation of inventory increase should be reduced to a per-car basis over
the proper period and December be given credit on the basis of cars shipped during
that month.
49
Prevo, on direct examination, R., III, 1300.
50 Hollis on cross examination said of these figures in his Scbedule: "That is the
adjustment of the proper period for the amount of prior months' adjustments re-
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The Earnings by Months and Quarters
The point has come where the factual question posed at the outset
can be answered. The books of Kaiser-Frazer, the 10-K Report, the
records of the Court, and the expert testimony of both accountants
have provided the figures for a general capitulation supplying the
actual breakdown of 1947 figures: (1) for the four quarters, (2) for
the two months ended November 30, (3) for the month of December itself. These figures are in complete prescission from the question of what was or was not actually disclosed in the Prospectus.
This is a factual inquiry designed only to clear the air and ground
for a consideration of the two remaining questions:- (1) Were the
facts concealed? Or even misrepresented? and, (2) Were they
material?
Using a composite of the schedules of Hollis (Schedule of Profit
and Loss after Distribution)"'and Prevo (Allocation of PriorMonths'
Adjustments) ,52 the table on the next page represents the actual earnings from operations for the various periods, after reallocation of the
$4,000,000.00 inventory write-up.
B. The Question of Disclosure
There seems to be little doubt about the actual earnings of KaiserFrazer during this period. There might be variations, insignificant in
amount, but the general totals all lead to the same conclusion. The
question then is: How should these facts of earnings be disclosed to
corded in the month of December, 1947." R., 111, 1797. Hollis did not contradict
Prevo but attempted to offset his redistribution of inventory write-ups in his alternafive explanation by concomitant reallocation of (1) Advertising Expenses, (2) Steel
Variances and (3) Miscellaneous Expenses. Hollis' final figure with this completely
new set of redistributions is $2.8 million profit for December. It is not said why these
figures were not actually used in the Prospectus if they were correct, nor how, if being
correct, they could justify the incorrect figures actually used, for public consumption.
As supplementary to this reasoning the Circuit Court rejected Hollis' hypothesis on the
grounds that: (1) The accounting procedure of reallocation was opposed to the system actually used by Kaiser-Frazer (which is probably the reason, in the beginning,
why it was not actualy used in preparing the Prospectus), and (2) on which the Summary was based. 195 F. 2d 838 at 843. The steel variances in the amount of $1,000,000.00
were traditionally written off in the month in which the steel was purchased and
in which the gray-market loss was sustained, and not, as Hollis would do, in the
month in which the steel was used. Advertising expenses were improperly allocated,
since there was December advertising of $758,000.00 which was not included in December in the Prospectus figures, so the result of removing November advertising
left December without any expense at all, which obviously was not the case. In
general, then, Hollis' hypothetical reallocation served only one good purpose, that of
revealing his true mind on the matter of redistribution of inventory write-ups lumped
in December. His attempt at a collateral and alternative explanation was abortive.
51 See note 42 supra.
52 See note 43 supra.
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the investor public? (1) Were the facts concealed from the investor
in the Prospectus? (2) Were they even misrepresented?
These questions will be treated per modum unius. There are five
areas of inquiry: (1) the earnings record for the year in toto, (2)
the first three quarters, (3) the fourth quarter alone, (4) the two
months ended November, (5) the month of December alone.
The Kaiser-Frazer argument has two major approaches:- (1)
"The earnings statement was proper in all respects." 58 (2) The accounting methods were acceptable. Under these two headings fall
most of the Kaiser-Frazer allegations.
Net Profit or Loss*
Period
$ 700,000*
From August 9 to December 31, 1945 ...............
19,000,000"
Year ended December 31, 1946 ....................
Eleven months ended November 30, 1947 ........... 18,200,000
Quarter
Quarter
Quarter
Quarter

ended
ended
ended
ended

March 31, 1947 .................
June 30, 1947 ...................
September 30, 1947 ..............
December 31, 1947 ..............

2,900,000*
1,700,000
9,300,000
11,100,000

Two months ended November 30, 1947 .............
Month ended December 31, 1947 ...................

10,200,000
900,000

Quarter ended December 31, 1947 ..................
Year ended December 31, 1947 .....................

11,100,000
19,100,000

September 30, 1947 ..................
October 31, 1947 ....................
November 30, 1947 ..................
December 31, 1947 ..................

4,500,000
6,100,000
4,100,000
900,000

Month
Month
Month
Month

ended
ended
ended
ended

The Earnings Summary in the Prospectus
The focal point is the month of December. To this Kaiser-Frazer
answers: "There was no separate statement in the Prospectus as to
the amount of December earnings."54 Therefore there could be nothing misleading in that particular. Implicit in this, moreover, is the
assumption that the average investor reading the Prospectus would
not subtract the $9,000,000.00 for the two months ended November
from the figure of $13,000,000.00 immediately below it in order to
ascertain the December earnings. Kaiser-Frazer says it is a "fallacy" to
53 Appellee's Brief, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, KaiserFrazer Corporation v. Otis, page 39.
54 Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, Supreme Court of the United States, Kaiser-Frazer Corporation v.
Otis, at page 14.

KAISER-FRASER V. OTIS

assume "that the investor would have made the arithmetical calculations." 55
Kaiser-Frazer explains the arrangement of earnings figures in the
Prospectus as a buildup dictated by the temporal exigencies involved
in adding the later and amended figures to the set appearing in the
Prospectus as it was filed anticipatory on the issue for January. At the
time of the earlier filing, December profits were not known, hence
earnings were shown only through the eleven months. Thus, logically, the first three quarters were given, and, of necessity, the two
months, period ended November. Then came the postponement of
the issue. On amendment, the fourth quarter was added, and the year,
but the original eleven months' figures and the two months ended
November were left intact "because the unaudited balance sheet in
the Prospectus was as of that date" and "the SEC requires this."5 6
This growth is advanced to explain the pattern in the Prospectus, the
separating asterisks, and the figures to November 30 and not year-end.
The more correct reasoning, it is submitted, would indicate: (1)
that although the $19,000,000.00 figure for the year was substantially
correct, nonetheless there was even some of that amount that should
have been allocated to the year previous; (2) that certainly the figure
of $13,000,000.00 for the fourth quarter was not merely a case of nondisclosure but a positive misrepresentation, being approximately $2.3
million in excess, since the profit from operations (and that was what
the captions in the Prospectus indicated) was not $13,000,000.00 but
$11,000,000.00 according to both Prevo and Hollis; (3) that the
average investor, as the Court of Appeals concluded, would immediately subtract the two months from the fourth quarter and be misled
into believing that (a) this was profit from operations and for December alone, and (b) that it was $4,000,000.00, and not $900,000.00.
(If this were not done, there was a second excellent opportunity to
be misled in the same manner by subtracting the eleven months from
the figure for the year); (4) that there was no valid reason, accounting-wise, for not listing December earnings in isolation, or, for that
matter, monthly earnings over the last two quarters, since the recent
earnings record was so brief and so important.
Refer at this point to Rule 421(a) of the General Rules and
Regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission under the
55 Appellee's Brief, 56, see note 53 supra. Such a claim seems to admit in some way

that if the subtraction were made the result would be deception.
56 Ibid., at 39.
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Securities Act of 1933, as amended. The Prospectus may not be arranged "in such fashion as to obscure any of the required information
or any information necessary to keep the required information from
being incomplete or misleading."5 7 The law interpreting this point
has been clear. Even though it may be true that all the relevant data
is presented in the Prospectus, the disposition of the figures, the
juxtaposition of one figure against another, the typography and gen8
eral arrangement may make the total impression misleading.
The Prospectus further concealed the fact that November earnings
were off by almost $2,000,000.00 from October. In short, there was
no way of knowing that the earnings graph would show the following downgrade:"
September
October
November
December

............... $4,500,000
................ 6,100,000
................ 4,000,000
................
900,000

The earnings record, so important and relevant to an informed and
intelligent analysis of the future prospects of the company, was not
disclosed and was even positively misrepresented.
The Accounting Methods
To all this Kaiser-Frazer replies that: "Clearly, the prospective
investor was put on notice that 'substantial adjustments,' including 'a
material increase for inventories,' has been made." 0 Reference was
also made to other cautionary phrases. It was ". . . tentative information. . . without audit ...on the basis of a preliminary closing. . .. "I"
In general it is argued that the whole tenor of the Prospectus, especially footnote 4 on page 7, would give the reader indication of the
nature of the figures.
General Rules and Regulations Securities and Exchange Commission, Rule 421 (a)y.
National Educators Mutual Ass'n, 1 S. E. C. 208, 215 (1935). There is pertinency
also in the following: "This has been the case not only where untrue statements made
at one point have been sought to be cured by subsequent contradictions elsewhere
57

58

...but also in situations where the failure to limit or qualify an inexact statement
at the very point where it was made was held to render the prospectus deficient, notwithstanding the statement was susceptible of correction from information supplied
elsewhere in the prospectus." Income Estates of America, 2 S. E. C. 434, 441 et seq.
(1937).
59 This is a composite of the Hollis and Prevo figures. See notes 42 and 43 supra.
60 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 20, see note 54 supra.

61 Prospectus, page 7.
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Again, there seems to be little support for the contention that the
footnote actually used in the Prospectus revealed the true state of
the earnings record, either in regard to the drop-off in operating
profits or the inventory write-ups. Rather cogent evidence of the
insufficiency of the footnote is provided in the expert testimony of
L. B. Nay, president of a Chicago investment firm. Mr. Nay relied
on the statements in the Prospectus and committed his firm to the
selling group. The extent to which he felt he had been informed can
be readily deduced from his reaction on reception of all the facts.
He was asked what he would have done had this information been
disclosed to him from the beginning.
That ...would have made it completely impossible for me to consider the
recommendation ... of these securities; and .. .would have further resulted
to those investors who already owned shares ... to
in my recommendations
62
dispose of them.

It could hardly be said that Mr. Nay felt he had full disclosure in the
Prospectus.
There is further indication of the efficacy of this footnote in the
history of its draft. On January 20, 1948, seven days before submission of the final footnote, the Touche-Niven accountant in charge
of the preparation and drafting of the Registration Statement and
Prospectus received word of the tentative year figures from KaiserFrazer; and "the indicated earnings for the 12 months before year-end
adjustments were only some three or five hundred thousand dollars
above the figures shown in the registration statement on page 7 of the
Prospectus for the 11 months. 6' 3 After extended discussion on the
matter the Touche-Niven accountant drafted the following tentative
footnote for the Prospectus:
Preliminary and tentative estimates as to the result of operation for December, 1947, and as to possible year-end adjustments (other than adjustments
affecting inventory) indicate that profits for the 12 months period ending
of the amount shown for
December 31, 1947, may not be materially in excess
64
the eleven months ended November 30, 1947.
62

Leston B. Nay, President of First Securities Company, Chicago, Direct Exami-

nation, R., IV, 2128.
63William W. Werntz, partner in the firm of Touche, Niven, Bailey & Smart,

Direct Examination, R., Il,1548. See Defendant's Exhibit 90, R., V,2832 for notation
of amendment of Registration Statement, dated January 27, 1948.
64
Werntz Handwritten Draft of Footnote to page 7 of Prospectus, Defendant's
Exhibit 106, R., V, 2862. Typewritten Draft, Defendant's Exhibit 107, R., V, 2864.

For comments by Werntz on direct examination, R., Il,1548, 9; 1551.
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This draft, which would have put a reader on notice, was not used.
Whether the footnote was rejected at the instance of Kaiser-Frazer
or Touche-Niven, or both, is not exactly relevant to this analysis,
but the fact of the consideration and rejection would seem to impugn
somewhat the Kaiser-Frazer statement that, "This calculation of earnings . .. had been approved by the independent public accountants
of Kaiser-Frazer who had participated in the drafting of the footnote,
which the Court of Appeals found to be inadequate."65 The other
independent firm of accountants, White, Bower & Prevo, reported
through Prevo:
This note conveys no concept of the enormity of the write-up, or that, in
disregard of the Company's own reports, the entire sum of $4,403,854 was ineluded in the profits for December.66

No positive misrepresentation can seemingly be imputed to the footnote, although one element does seem to exceed mere non-disclosure.
Inspection of the evolution of the phraseology of the footnote indicates the possibility of positive deception. As first drafted it read:4) The tentative information for the quarter and year ended December 31,

1947, reflects year end adjustments including a material increase in inventories
to conform to the results of a complete physical inventory taken by the Corporation as of December 31, 1947.67

This typewritten form was corrected by hand with two additions:
(1) the words "various substantial" were inserted after "reflects,"
and (2) "provision for certain reserves and" were placed after "including." Certainly there is warranted adversion to the fact that
provisions for reserves invariably indicate decreases in earnings (unless out of surplus), whereas the increase in inventory increases the
earnings. An investor could be expected to conclude that these items,
without more indication or details to the contrary, set up as they
were in the Prospectus tended to offset each other and leave the
earnings record substantially intact and representative of profits from
operations.
In this connection Kaiser-Frazer's statement that "The earnings
statement and footnote became part of the Registration Statement
which the Securities and Exchange Commission permitted to become
65 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 15, see note 54 supra.
66 Affidavit of Harry M. Prevo in Support of Motion, District Court of the United
States, For the Southern District of New York, July 20, 1949, R., 1, 133.
67 Amendment of Footnote 4 of the Prospectus, Defendant's Exhibit 96, R., V,
2844. Comments by Werntz concerning his part in the rephrasing are at R., IV, 2271-2.
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effective," 68 is misleading on two counts. First, the SEC cannot and

does not pass on the accuracy or adequacy of the Prospectus,6 9 and
second, Kaiser-Frazer ignores the very important fact that Otis made
every attempt in the District Court, but was overruled, to introduce
evidence that the accountants for the SEC had not been informed of
the true nature of the earnings figures in the Prospectus, but were
deceived as to the total status of Kaiser-Frazer' ° The District Court
made no comment on the footnote.
The nub of the question of disclosure and misrepresentation is a
simple one: Did the Prospectus actually reveal the true state of
earnings? Another way to put this same question is to ask: Were
the accounting methods proper? Accounting methods, in this context,
are designed for only one purpose, to tell the true story in conventionalized figures and schedules. When Kaiser-Frazer says that accounting methods were proper this is what is meant. Looking down
from bird's-eye on the whole problem of disclosure and the accounting methods used to effect this disclosure, what is the summary status
of the problem?
The Otis expert accountant contemned the methods employed by
Kaiser-Frazer in disclosing the true status of the company. Hollis,
Kaiser-Frazer's expert, made no direct rebuttal or denial of this statement. Hollis by-passed a direct clash with Prevo and testified that
even supposing the figures actually used were wrong, they were not
wrong in end result, because if a proper reallocation had been effected, the profits for December would still have been $2.8 million,
(which would have been over $1,000,000.00 in excess of the actual
profits) and so no one would have been misled by very much.
Kaiser-Frazer is insistent on the point that the methods and figures
that it actually endorses are the ones actually used in the Prospectus.
It states that it brought forward the second set of figures only in an
effort to show that the accounting methods advocated by Otis (which
consisted chiefly in the allocation of the inventory write-ups to the
68 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 15, see note 54 supra.

69 The order of the SEC making any registration statement effective is in no
way approval. Section 23 of the Act makes it unlawful to represent to any investor
that the S. E. C. has in any way passed on the merits or even that the Commission has
found that the registration statement is complete or accurate. Pursuant to Rule 425,
the Kaizer-Frazer Prospectus carried the following on the first page: "These securities have not been approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission nor has the
Commission passed upon the accuracy or adequacy of this prospectus." See: Oklahoma-Texas Trust v. S. E. C., 100 F. 2d 888 (CA. 10th, 1939).
70R., IIl, 1561-63; 1616-19.
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prior months), if properly employed, resulted in a total December
earnings of $2.8 million, which was not far from the figures resulting
from the methods employed by Kaiser-Frazer, which showed earnings for December at $4,009,382.53. 7'
The conclusion to the question would seem to be this: (1) If
Kaiser-Frazer is prepared to stand by the methods actually employed,
there is little evidence in favor of accounting procedures that disclose so little and misrepresent so much. (2) Why was there no
attack on the methods advanced by Prevo, which carry with them
a basic logic that seems irrefutable?7 2 (3) Were it to be assumed,
ex arguendo, that the second set of figures advanced by Hollis were
correct, the bald fact is that the Prospectus nonetheless carried the
false figures; and (4) Another set of figures, albeit correct, does not
remedy the original incorrect set (if 2 and 2 are 4, the public wants
to see it that way, not 3 and 3 are 4.); (5) But even the second set
of figures are not acceptable because they do not reflect the actual
state of affairs and are inconsistent with Kaiser-Frazer's accounting
system,-the system used in preparing the figures in the Prospectus.73
Accepted Accounting Principles
Undoubtedly the ultimate norm in determining the propriety of
the accounting methods actually employed by Kaiser-Frazer and
71 After Hollis had made the redistribution of the inventory write-ups which he
had, in his presentation of the figures in the Prospectus, placed in December, he went
back over the books and found various sums in other months that rightfully belonged
in December. (See notes 47 and 50 supra, and corresponding sections in body.) With
these adjustments Hollis arrived at the following monthly profit figures:
September ........................
O ctober ...........................
N ovember .........................
December .........................

$4,500,000
5,500,000
4,000,000
2,800,000

See: Schedule of Profit and Loss by Periods, Schedule 1, note 42 supra. These figures
were effected chiefly by adjustments of advertising expense, miscellaneous expense
and steel variances. These allocations were discussed fully in note 50 supra and rejected by the Circuit Court for the reasons already noted.
72 Harry M. Prevo, Direct Testimony, R., II, 1307 et seq. This has excellent probative force.
7a Kaiser-Frazer stresses this in Petition for Writ of Certiorari, passim 15, note 54
supra. It is submitted that Kaiser-Frazer showed considerable vagueness and confusion in its stand on the accounting practices. In proceeding through the record it is
not clear, whether Kaiser-Frazer is going to stand with its methods and figures in the
Prospectus or whether the new set submitted by Hollis is an alternative. Thus it is
understandable, if true, as Kaiser-Frazer states: "Thus the Court of Appeals misinterpreted the findings of the District Court on this important issue of fact and misunderstood the purpose and effect of the evidence . . ." Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 16, see note 54 supra. This same misunderstanding is reflected consciously in
the unfolding of this issue in these pages.
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Touche, Niven is a close study of the true facts held up against the
published Prospectus. In other words it is an ad hoc matter. This
does not mean that some further insight cannot be gained by a very
brief resume of the pertinent accounting principles applicable in the
instant problem. This resume, therefore, will be made.
The SEC has been very explicit in its statement of the practice to
be followed in presenting full facts about unusual items, such as
non-recurring increment, in the earnings summary. Accounting Series
Release No. 62 is exactly to the point:
In order that investors may make proper use of the summary earnings table
and to prevent the possibility of misleading inferences, certain explanatory
data are usually necessary. If, for example, the reported earnings reflect the
results of unusual conditions, or in certain years include significant nonrecurring items of income or expenses, an appropriate disclosure of such con74
ditions or items is made either in the summary or in the footnotes thereto.

The extreme importance of the actual earnings record as an indication to the investor of the future of the firm is expressed in some
detail in Accounting Release No. 53. The same stress on full disclosure of non-recurring items is also made.
In reaching a judgment as to the future prospects of a company it is customary to begin with a statement of actual operations for an appropriate past
period. . . In general, what is done is to segregate and earmark what are
considered to be unusual and nonrecurring items of income, expense and loss
so that the reader will be warned of them and so may arrive at a conclusion
as to whether such items can be expected to recur. In addition, special treatment is accorded items of income or loss or expense that have been reported
in the financial statements of one year, say 1943, but which by reason of later
events or knowledge, are now known to have been actually part of the costs
or revenues applicable to another year, say 1942. In such cases, it is customary
• ..to include such items in the year to which they are now known to be
75
related.

This would seem to be justifiably related to the unallocated inventory
in the Kaiser-Frazer Prospectus. Later in the Release the SEC states
that "the items included therein should clearly and accurately reflect
'
only actual operations. 76
The seventh edition of Montgomery's Auditing lays down the
principle very clearly:
Surplus adjustments, material in amount, have occurred frequently in practice, and . . . when they affect the income of any period included in the
registration statement ... earnings summary ... the best practice is to restate
the income accounts of prior years. Recasting may also be required in respect
74

SEC, Accounting Series Releases, Release No. 62, at page 194 (1948).

75 SEC, Release No. 53, at page 145.
76

SEC, Release No. 53, at page 148.
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of reserves provided in prior years for costs or losses which were materially

different from the provisions therefor. . . .Notwithstanding that this results
in net income different from that previously reported, the guiding objective
should be to make a fair presentation in the light of information obtained
77
since the earlier statements were issued.

At another point Montgomery's Auditing touches very close to the
Otis situation:
When an income statement is submitted for an interim period of less than
one year and there is reason to believe that the income and expenses for the
interim period may not be indicative of the rate of yearly earnings because
of seasonal variations or for other reasons, it is essential that a footnote to that
effect be appended. The need for this precautionary note should also be considered in connection
with the summary of earnings in the narrative section
78
of the prospectus.

C. The Question of Materiality
In the deductive process the difficulty generally does not lie in the
ascertainment of the general principles applicable, but in the application of the principles to the instant facts. So it is in the question of
materiality. Fortunately, here, the norms for determination are clear,
and their expression frequent. Even more fortunately, the instant

facts, held up for application to the general principles, leave little
doubt about materiality. First the norm, then the application.
The Principle Applicable
In the most general terms the Restatement of Torts has crystallized
the definition of materiality: A fact is material if "its existence or
nonexistence is a matter to which a reasonable man would attach im-

portance in determining his course of action in the transaction in
question."7 The Restatement adds that a fact is material if "the
maker of the representation knows that its recipient is likely to regard
the fact as important although a reasonable man would not so regard
it."' 80

This last concept is important, and received fuller elaboration
in connection with the courts' interpretation of the securities laws.
Reliance cannot be placed on the norm of "a person of ordinary business intelligence," since the securities laws "were enacted for the very
purpose of protecting those who lack business acumen." 8 1 In other
Montgomery's Auditing (Seventh Ed., 1949) 519.
]bid., at 519, 520.
79 Rest. Torts, § 538 (2) (1938).
80 Ibid.
77

78

"I United States v. Monjar, 47 Fed. Supp. 421, 425 (D.C. Del., 1942), aff'd 147 F. 2d

916 (C.A. 3d, 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 859; See also: S. E. C. v. Timetrust, Inc.,
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words, "the monumental credulity of the victim is no shield for the
accused.18 2 This does not mean that the Prospectus must "state every
fact about a stock offered that a prospective purchaser might like to
know or that might, if known, tend to influence his decision. '8 3 But
it does prohibit half-truths, 4 and requires such disclosure as the Commission has stipulated in its definition of materiality: The information demanded is confined "to those matters as to which an average
prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed before purchasing
the security registered."8 5 The District Court quoted this Commission
rule.8 6 A material fact has also been defined as one "which if it had
been correctly stated or disclosed would have deterred or tended to
deter the average prudent investor from purchasing the securities
in question."87
Keeping these principles in mind, the question is: Were the facts,
not disclosed and even misrepresented, material? The question could
even be better put in the words of the Commission: Was the following verified in Kaiser-Frazer's Prospectus?
On a consideration of this record as a whole, the cumulative effect of these
deficiencies is such that the registration statement and the prospectus do not
adequately reflect the information necessary for an intelligent understanding
of the business in which the prospective purchaser of the securities registered
is asked to invest his money. 88

Such a general norm takes the question up to a broader plane and
removes the issue from one or more isolated instances of non-dis28 Fed. Supp. 34, 42, 43, 1 S. E. C. Jud. Dec. 737 (N.D. Cal., 1939); Rex v. Johnston

(1932), O.R. 79, 57 C.C.C. 132 (1932) 1 D.L.R. 655 (Can. Cr. Code § 414).
82

Deaver v. United States, 155 F. 2d 740, 744, 745 (App. D.C., 1946), cert. denied
329 U.S. 766. But, see: S. E. C. v. Gold Hub Mines Co., 1 S. E. C. Jud. Dec. 634, 635
(D.C. Colo., 1939).
83 Otis & Co. v. S. E. C., 106 F. 2d 579, 582 (C.A. 6th, 1939), 1 S. E. C. Jud. Dec. 790.
84 As Lord Macnaghten phrased it: ". . . everybody knows that sometimes half a

truth is no better than a downright falsehood." Rex v. Kyslant, [1932] 1 K.B. 442.
See also: Hughes v. S. E. C., 174 F. 2d 969, 976 (App. D.C., 1949); Equitable Co. v.
Halsey, Stuart & Co., 312 U.S.; 410, 425, 426.
85 General Rules and Regulations under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended,

Securities and Exchange Commission, Rule 405. The same general language was found
in The Lord Davey Report of 1895, one of the reports on English Company Law
reform: ".... every contract or fact is material which would influence the judgment
of a prudent investor in determining whether he would subscribe for the shares or
debentures offered by the prospectus." Cmd. 7770 (1895) § 14(5); also see Macleay v.
Tait, [1906] A.C. 24.
86 Opinion of the District Court, R., V, 3076.
87 Charles A. Howard, 1 S. E. C. 6, 8, 18 F.T.C. 626 (1934).
88 Mutual Industrial Bankers, Inc., 1 S. E. C. 208, 215 (1935).
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closure and misrepresentation. Was the Prospectus in overall such
as to reveal the true state and full picture?
The Principles Applied
The central issue in the question of the materiality of the non-disclosure and misrepresentation of the Earning Summary in the Prospectus has six distinct elements: The importance to the investor
of (1) the recent (2) upward (3) trend (4) of substantial increment
(5) from operating profits, (6) not from revaluation, recount of
inventory or absorption of reserve. In the Otis case the complexus
of these elements spells materiality.
(1) The Kaiser-Frazer Corporation had been in business for a
brief period. Its earnings record was even briefer. There was only
the shortest span of time to which an investor could look, the six or
seven months immediately preceding the issue. For the investor to
be denied the information for the very last month, or to have the
recent months grouped with the earlier without the ability to extract
the more recent, was a material deprivation of information. The only
adequate presentation of the recent record was month-by-month.
Were the company long in- business, with many years behind it,
established in the field, then perhaps a year-by-year presentation
would be in order. But here was a firm attempting to break into an
ironclad field, only a few months out of the red. For it, months were
the only evidence and the only periods that could tell anything.
It is clear that the (2) upward nature of earnings record was essential. As portrayed in the Prospectus the profits were up. In fact,
for the months of November and December they were down. This,
to say the least, is material. When the downward element is combined
with evidences of a (3) trend, further materiality is present. Had the
graph of earnings been up and then down, and, at the moment of
the issue, down, it would have been one thing. But it was another
that the earnings had been heading down in a trend from $6,000,000.00
in October, to $4,000,000.00 in November and $900,000.00 in December. An investor might well conclude, especially in the face of the
well-known sellers' market that he was seeing all around him in the
latter months of 1947, that Kaiser-Frazer had exhausted itself by
October and was on the way down. This downward trend was concealed. In fact every indication pointed to a trend in the opposite
direction.
Determination of how (4) substantial an increment is involved can
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be premised on several fundaments,-percentage of return on capital,
ratio of sales to total assets, or to net worth, net income per share of
common stock, and so on. Or a less technical comparison can be made
between recent profit trends and prior losses. By any of these norms,
the amounts involved in the Kaiser-Frazer suppression were substantial, and hence highly material to an investor. The sum in question
was $3.1 million. Perhaps the first sign of the magnitude of this
amount is the disastrous effect its subtraction would have on the earnings record. Probably the next thing a competent layman would do
would be to consider its effect on the overall financial status of the
company. It is only by the write-up of $3.1 million that the losses
roughly amounting to $19,000,000.00 for 1946 can be offset by the
profits for 1947. Without that write-up the public would conclude
to a deficit in excess of $3,000,000.00 in overall. This, of course, is
posited on the unnecessary hypothesis that not only were the writeups misplaced in December, but that they were illegitimate at base
and completely unfounded, which is a predication that need not be
pressed here. It would be difficult to assert that the amount involved
here was not substantial.
Probably the most important single element affecting materiality
was the nature of the increment. The investor is interested in (5)
operating profits, and not in (6) unusual increment from non-recurring items,-at least in assessing the value of a stock to be purchased.
It is most material to conceal or misrepresent this distinction. The
investor, once he has invested, will be most happy to realize dividends
from any source, be it a windfall from an inventory recount, or from
a sharp upswing in prices affecting current inventory, or from the
sudden retirement of an unnecessary inventory reserve, but these
items are not of interest to him in his attempt to gauge the future
earnings of the firm, since they are not profits from operations.
"... Past earnings are significant only when they tend to reflect
future returns."89 Thus Kaiser-Frazer was guilty of a double dereliction in putting inventory in the earnings totals, and in not telling
what this amount was, granting for the sake of argument that it belonged here, which it did not. Both of these elements are material.
Inventory in earnings is a misrepresentation. Concealment of the
nature of this figure was non-disclosure. So, even if the inventory did
belong in December, it should have been so denominated as inven8

9 United States v. Toronto Nay. Co., 338 U.S. 396, 403 (1949).

DE PAUL LAW REVIEW

tory, since it affected so appreciably the investor's estimate of the
profit trend.
By way of denouement, it is somewhat ironic to hear the KaiserFrazer attorneys, in a leter of July, 1947, advise Kaiser-Frazer's vicepresident and director of the firm's duties in regard to the Prospectus:
Under the Securities Act of 1933, each director of the corporation is liable
in the event the Prospectus contains any untrue statement of a material fact
or omits to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary
to make the statements therein not misleading. It is, therefore, essential that
the Prospectus contain all facts, especially those of an unfavorable nature,
which might affect the value of the stock offered or the possible earning
power of the corporation.0

There is one final reflection on the matter of disclosure. In the concerted reflection on what was concealed and misrepresented there is
a tendency to overlook the ease with which the entire and true status
of the company's earnings record could have been disclosed, either
by giving the correct figures of monthly earnings from operations,
or, less forthrightly, by footnoting the exact nature of the figures
used. Even this latter method would be confusing, since there is no
apparent reason, other than the desire to withhold the true state of
affairs from the reader, for not giving a monthly breakdown. In an
instance such as this where the chief emphasis is on the brief record
of profits from operations, there is all the more reason for a monthby-month breakdown of operating earnings.
The Question of Otis' Knowledge
At many places throughout the Kaiser-Frazer briefs91 Otis is
claimed to have had full knowledge of all the material facts concerning the earnings record. The Court of Appeals felt that "factually
there is some support for Kaiser-Frazer's contention," 92 and that Otis,
apparently took part in the preparation of the registration statement and the Prospectus.""
A study of the record leaves clearly conflicting impressions. The
Kaiser-Frazer brief cites an instance in the record where counsel for
Otis is informed on January 20, 1948, of December earnings at $300,000.00 to $500,000.00. 4 This citation is offset by the declaration
following immediately in the record where the same attorney was
90 Letter of Walston S. Brown of Willkie, Owen, Farr, Gallagher & Walton, to
E. E. Trefethen, Vice-President of Kaiser-Frazer Corporation, July 26, 1947, Defendant's Exhibit 151, R., V, 2962.
91 Appellee's Brief, 38, 42, 57' see note 53 supra.
92 195 F. 2d 838, 843 (C.A. 2d, 1952).
93 Ibid.
94 R., III, 1527-29.
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told on two or more occasions that ". . . the people in Detroit just
didn't believe it; they thought there was some explanation of those
figures and it wasn't anywhere near as bad as this report would indicate, and they wanted to set up a meeting to talk over the whole situation. . ."" And finally, this same attorney testified that on January
21, 1948, Edgar Kaiser ". . . spoke about Mr. Hamman being one of
the younger men with Touche-Niven, that he had worked on the
Kaiser-Frazer account there, that he had jumped at certain conclusions on the basis of some preliminary figures which, after analysis,
were explainable . . ." by Edgar Kaiser. 6 Edgar Kaiser himself was
asked if he told Otis' counsel on January 21, 1948, that the December
figures did not indicate an adverse trend, and he testified: "I prob97
ably did, because I believed that at the time and I believe it now.
The net result of a perusal of the record is doubt, with the guarded
conclusion being that Otis' counsel might well have had some suspicion of an unusual state of affairs98 an could well have thereby been
put on notice to investigate more fully. But it would seem that he did
not truly appreciate the figures behind the record in the Prospectus.9
The cautious expressions of the Court of Appeals probably best reflect the record on the point. Later considerations will seemingly
have to be posited on the double hypothesis, that (1) Otis did have
knowledge, and that (2) it did not.
Preparatory to a consideration of the duty to disclose and the extent to which the acts perpetrated violated that duty, this is the conclusion that has been reached thus far: The December earnings from
operations, in contradistinction to inventory writeups, were not only
concealed, but misrepresented, and these earnings and their misrepresentation were material.
The questions now are: Was this misrepresentation of a material
fact a violation of a duty to disclose? What was that duty? To what
extent was it violated?
The Disclosure Requirements in an Underwriting Venture
"... (2) violated the duty to disclose under the Common Law,
the Securities Act of 1933, and
the Contract itself. .

....

From Part 11:-Solution
95 R., III, 1529.
98

96 R.,

III, 1531.

97 R., IV, 1928.

See: R., III, 1527-29, 1631: IV, 1922; 1920; 1927-29; III, 1548-49; 1587.
99
See: R., I1, 1529, 1531-32; IV, 1932, 1941-42, 1928-29.
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Taking the view from the hill-top, an underwriting venture in its
totality,-from the earliest moment that the issue is contemplated to

the last step after the public investor has received his stock,-involves
two broad considerations in the matter of disclosure requirements.

First and far more important, the underwriting venture is a general
undertaking involving the public welfare and cloaked with public
responsibility. Second, and less important, it is an arrangement in-

volving the rights and duties inter sese of participating parties. These
points of view are very important in an analysis of Otis. If the case is
viewed, on the one hand, as simply an isolated, albeit noisy, battle between two litigants who should have known better, the array of rights
and duties, violations and damages, claims and counterclaims, take on
very definite and categorized aspects. If, on the other hand, every attention is directed toward the monumental truth that here is an important underwriting venture directed towards the general investing

public and affecting its rights in a very intimate way, considerations
that otherwise never would have entered the mind will be of great
influence, even controlling.
The Venture as a Whole
This Otis case, then, clearly concerns itself principally with the
essential nature of the total underwriting venture and the relation of
that venture to the general public. The first duty in such a venture,
incumbent on all the parties involved, is owed to the public investor.
The prime considerations revolve around the question: Did the underwriting venture, and the contract that embodied its spirit, purpose
and terms, conform in essence to the legal and moral standards of
disclosure in protection of the investing public?
Once the venture as a whole is viewed as bearing a grave duty to
the investing public, the next question to ask is: Who, among the
persons party to such a venture, has the responsibility of seeing to it
that this duty is performed, that the overall nature, purpose and terms
of the enterprise conform to the disclosure requirements of law and
morality? The duty is threefold and in order of incumbency and
stringency:100 (1) on the issuer; 01 (2) on the underwriter; 0 2 (3)
100 The whole question of the ethical philosophy and the moral theology of the
hierarchy of duties of the respective parties in an underwriting venture in relation
101 The issuer has first responsibility (see Section 6(a) of the Act) because his is the
full control, his is the stock, to him goes the bulk of the purchase price, his is the full
102 The underwriter, as quasi agent for the issuer, has a great professional duty to
the general public. His is the duty of reasonable investigation, prudent carefulness
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on the government.'0 3 In making this breakdown of the overall duty,
the point should not be missed that the primary question is not one of
the violation of duty of any particular member of the underwriting
venture, but rather of the total defection or deficiency of the essential nature, spirit, purpose and terms of the venture qua venture in its
relation to the general investing public. 10

4

The consideration, then,

[Footnote 100 continued]

to the overall legality and morality of the total venture is a complex study in itself.
Here is merely presented the conclusions from such a study, based on norms taken
from the natural law, moral theology, the common law, the statutory legislation of
the United States, especially the Securities Act and the rules and regulations of the
SEC, and the custom and practice of the underwriting community.
[Footnote 101 continued]

knowledge of all the facts. In short, he is the one who is selling. (The public is the
buyer, hence to him is owed the primary duty.) All this is borne out by the customs
of the financial community and the hierarchy of liability in the Act. Thus, in Section
11(a) are listed in this order: any signer of the registration statement, directors or
partners of the issuer, accountants, engineers or appraisers, and the underwriter. On
the issuer devolves the duty of preparing the registration statement, of signing and
filing it. Here should be noted the moral and legal responsibilities of the accountants
in the employ of the issuer. Their duty is also great, subsidiary to the issuer of course,
but certainly of a secondary liability and prior to that of the underwriter. Section
11(a). The act "goes as far in protection of purchasers of securities as plaintiff in
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931), unsuccessfully urged
the New York Court of Appeals to go in the protection of a creditor. The change
which that court thought so 'revolutionary' as to be 'wrought by legislation' has been
made. And the duty placed on experts such as accountants has not been measured by
the expert's relation to his employer but by his service to investors." Douglas and
Bates, Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 Yale L.J. 197 (1933).
[Footnote 102 continued]
and general supervision. His relatively low emolument, the need for mass flotations,
all decrease the demands that can be made on the underwriter. It should be noted,
too, that the major underwriters are no longer protected by the lack of privity.
103 The government as the duly authorized guardian of the commonweal and the
specific custodian of the public welfare bears the third position of liability. This duty
is both general and specific. The government has, in general under any circumstances
and in so far as possible, the duty to protect its citizens from harm. Specifically, under
the present and current context of our United States government, there has been a
specific delegation of this duty principally to the S. E. C. Section 8. This duty, however, should not be overemphasized. It is tertiary, to begin with, and is further limited
in the specific instance of the SEC by restriction on the grant of power and the
delegation of duty by the Federal government. Section 23 makes it very clear that
the SEC has at best a negative duty. Consider also the announcement affixed to
every prospectus as required by the SEC rules and regulations. See note 57 and
body supra.
104 The House Committee on the bill summed up the hierarchy of duty excellently:
..the duty of care to discover varies in its demands upon participants in security
distribution with the importance of their place in the scheme of distribution and with
the degree of protection that the public has a right to expect." A Study of the Economic and Legal Aspects of the Proposed Federal Securities Act, Department of
Commerce, Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R.
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is directed in the first place to the essential nature of the venture, and
the contract embodying it, and at the derelictions of the individual
parties only in the second place and in so far as those derelictions infect the total venture and effect the net result of a violation of the
rights of the public investor.
The Duties of the Parties Inter Sese
The second broad consideration, interwoven with the problem surrounding the venture as a whole, is the relation subsisting under law
and the contract between Kaiser-Frazer the issuer and Otis the underwriter. The question there is: Have the actions of Kaiser-Frazer
rendered the contract unenforceable in so far as it is referable to Otis?
Considered on a strict contractual basis between Kaiser-Frazer and
Otis alone, is the contract binding? Or did Kaiser-Frazer so breach
the conditions of the contract as to excuse Otis from performance
under it? This second broad question will be properly approached by
the same study of the duty of disclosure.
What then are the standards of law and morals to which an underwriting venture must conform? What are the sources of these standards? The underwriting venture and the contract which embodies it,
-as well as all the parties constituent of the venture,-are governed
by duties and standards arising out of three great sources: (1) the
Common Law; (2) the Securities Act of 1933; (3) the contract
itself. Under these headings will be treated the nature, scope, and
application of the disclosure requirements regulating an underwriting
venture, and the extent of violation under each. The effect of the
violation of these laws can then reasonably be discussed.
(1) The Duty to Disclose at Common Law1 05
Both logically and chronologically the point of departure in a
study of disclosure obligations is the common law. Statutory provisions have not superseded the common law, but merely built onto it,
elaborated and refined it. Due to this background many of the concepts of the common law contribute appreciably to the interpretation
of the modern statutes. 106 The common law action for deceit lay in
4314, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 85. The stipulations granting contribution under Section
11(f) of the Act accentuate the joint duty of all to the general investing public.
105 There is patently a double common-law consideration, tort and contract. The
question of contract will be treated infra under the treatment of the enforceability
of the contract.
106 See Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 Yale L.J. 227 (1933).
This differentiates common law deceit and the Act.
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tort for damages. There
are parallel, early, criminal statutes for sales
10 7

under false pretenses.
The tort action of deceit requires six concurrent elements: (1)
A false representation, (2) of a material'0 (3) fact, (4) made knowingly,-scienter,-to induce reliance, (5) with consequent reliance' 01
and (6) damage.
Quite clearly since neither a public investor nor Otis actually purchased the securities on the basis of the representations in the Prospectus no action would lie in tort. The instant case is a suit-in contract,
by the seller, not the buyer. The question here rather is: What was
the duty to disclose incumbent on Kaiser-Frazer at common-law tort?
Of the six required elements only the first two,-a false and material
representation,-contain the prescriptions for disclosure at common
law. Since the question of materiality has been answered in substantially the same manner by both the common law and the SEC, the
chief remaining points are the definitions of false representation,
and scienter.
Rex v. Kylsant (1932)
The prosecution of Lord Kylsant under the English Larceny Act
of 1861 is an important part of the legislative history of the Securities
Act," 0 illustrates excellently the common-law interpretation of a
false representation, and offers highly suasive parity of facts with Otis.
Lord Kylsant went to prison because the prospectus issued through
his steamship line, incident to the sale of stock, was held violative of
the Larceny Act which made it a misdemeanor for a director to make
"... any written statement or account which he shall know to be
false in any material particular in order to effect a sale of stock." All
of the statements made in the prospectus were perfectly true, but
when considered in total context and in the light of what was not
said, they made the prospectus false. The true average net income for
the ten years before 1928 was given. The dividends declared and paid
over the previous seventeen years were listed. It was openly admitted
that the company had suffered, with the entire industry, during the
07
'
The earliest is 30 Statute of Geo. II, c. 24 (1757). See 2 Wharton, Criminal Law
(12th Ed., 1932) § 1395 et seq., Statutory Cheats by False Pretenses.
108 Discussion of materiality supra page 160 et seq.
109 This point will be discussed infra at page 74"... (6) and notwithstanding alleged
estoppel due to Otis' knowledge."
11o The rule in this case became part of the Securities Act. See Frankfurter, The
Federal Securities Act: II, Fortune, August, 1933, p. 108. Rex v. Kylsant, [1932] 1 K.B.
442.
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depression years. But the prospectus neglected to state (1) That the
bulk of the profits had come from increased business in postwar 1918,
(2) That these profits were all centered in the three war-end years,
and (3) That the following seven years were very lean indeed. As
with Otis, two very material points were concealed: (1) The nonrecurring nature of the profits, and (2) The downward trend in
earnings. The court held that in spite of the literal truth of each statement, the prospectus as a whole gave a false impression.
The Supreme Court of the United States has given evidence of
concurrence with the rule in Kylsant. In the Equitable Life Insurance
case an investment banking house, in the sale of a municipal bond
issue to the plaintiff, omitted to reveal the declining financial state of
the guarantor on the bonds, a lumber company. The Supreme Court
paraphrased the Restatement with approval: ". . . a statement of a
half truth is as much a misrepresentation as if the facts stated were untrue." 1 The common law, however, fails to hold a person liable for
complete nondisclosure unless the party has a particular duty to use
reasonable care to disclose ". . . because of a fiduciary or other similar
relation of trust and confidence between them... "12 or ". . . by concealment or other action intentionally prevents the other from acquiring material information. ' "'
The question of scienter is important in so far as it indicates the
manner in which the duty can be violated. If there is a misrepresentation of a material fact, must it be made with deliberate intent to deceive, or simply with knowledge of the falsity, or is innocent error
sufficient where there is a duty to avoid such errors and the misrepresentation is in fact material and misleading? Early constructions of
scienter at common law made recovery for deceit almost impossible
and it was necessary in effect to prove thievery. Gradually, however,
the courts broadened the definition of the concept to the extent of
holding the defendant for culpable negligence. Thus the Federal
Court of Appeals in Stein v.Treger has stated that "Where a party
innocently misrepresents a material fact by mistake ... such misrep114
resentation will support an action for fraud.1

111 Equitable Life Insurance Co. of Iowa v. Halsey, Stuart & Co., 312 U.S. 410,

424-26 (1941), 36 111.L. Rev. 117 (1941). Thus also: "A statement in a business transaction which, while stating the truth so far as it goes, the maker knows or believes
to be materially misleading because of his failure to state qualifying matter is a fraudulent misrepresentation." Restatement of Torts, S 529. See also: Newman v. Corn
Exchange National Bank and Trust Co., 356 Pa. 442, 51 A. 2d 759 (1947).
112 Rest., Torts, § 551 (1938).
111 Rest., Torts, § 550 (1938).
114

182 F. 2d 696, 699. (App. D.C., 1950).
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Evaluating the state of intent in Kaiser-Frazer there is little doubt
that there was at least full knowledge of the misrepresented facts. Otis
felt it could prove intent to deceive, but allowed that that was not
necessary. It would seem that a favorable construction on the words
of Edgar Kaiser would also indicate that although there was knowledge of the misrepresentation it was in good faith and with a conviction that what was de facto misleading, material and false, was the
truth. Put another way, Kaiser-Frazer was guilty objectively, but not
subjectively. Thus Kaiser-Frazer would have scienter even without
resort to the liberal rule of the Stein case, since there was no mistake
but full knowledge, albeit the misrepresentation may have been innocent,....
In general it can be said, irrespective of what the event would be
in regard to proof of the other elements requisite to common-law
tort,"5 that Kaiser-Frazer was clearly derelict under the common-law
norms of disclosure. At most the earnings record in the Summary
was a half-truth, and Kaiser-Frazer presented it with full knowledge
that was at best naively innocent and a culpable error of judgment.
(2) Statutory Legislation
In the present-day, well-legislated context of the United States
the prime norm for disclosure in an underwriting venture is to be
found in the statutory provisions of three acts. The provisions are
superimposed on the common law, and although not superseding it
they have, as a practical matter, supplanted it both as to feasibility of
remedy and specificity of requirements. All three of these statutes
have application to the Otis case. Although both the Mail Fraud
Statute" 6 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 n1 have similar
provisions, the various sections of the Securities Act of 1933 are more
intimately applicable to Otis and warrant direct treatment.
Preliminary Considerations
The study of the securities legislation as applied to the Otis case
must be kept within three broad frames of reference: (1) The double
point-of-view:-the total venture in relation to the public investor,
and Kaiser-Frazer to Otis. (2) The double question:-Did KaiserFrazer's misrepresentation violate each particular provision? Could
115 The prospects for the plaintiff in the common-law action of deceit are not
promising and the obstacles are almost insuperable. See, Shulman, note 106 supra,
230 to 235.
116 18 U. S. C. 5 1341. (1948).
117 15 U. S. C. § 78. (1950).
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Otis recover? (3) The double hypothesis concerning Otis' knowledge of the misrepresentation: -that Otis did and did not have full
knowledge.
The Securities Act of 1933
From the words of Franklin Roosevelt in his message recommending the Act to Congress "...
no essentially important element attending the issue shall be concealed from the buying public ...
to the summary of the legislative purpose-"The basic policy underlying the act is that of informing the investor of the facts concerning
securities and providing protection against fraud and misrepresentation"1"9 -there has been one clear aim,-full disclosure, and protection
of the public investor against deception.
Substantially the same requirements are set down in four different
sections of the Act, but they are adapted to applications necessary
under varying circumstances. Considered broadly, the Act forbids
(1) any misrepresentation or non-disclosure of a material fact (2) in
the sale of securities (3) in interstate commerce or the mails.
Still viewing the Act broadly, these requirements are supported by
sanctions of three kinds:-(1) The stop-order issued by the Commission preventing the sale of securities. (2) The civil liabilities of all
parties responsible for the flotation. (3) Criminal liability.
The Relevant Provisions of the Act
Toward full disclosure the Act requires that the investor be furnished with the facts essential to an intelligent judgment of the value
of the security being offered for sale. This information is contained in
the Registration Statement filed with the Commission and the Prospectus supplied to the investor. Supporting this requirement is the
stop-order sanction of Section 8(d):
(d) If it appears to the Commission at any time that the registration statement includes any untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state any
material fact . . .the Commission may . . .issue a stop order suspending the
effectiveness of the registration statement.

In the early Kaiser-Frazer attempts to secure an effective order for
the Registration Statement the SEC required rectification of certain
deficiencies in the statement. The Registration Statement, however,
that eventually became effective and the Prospectus actually handed
11SMessage to Congress of Franklin Roosevelt, March 29, 1933, Hearings, see
note 104 supra, 1.

110 McCormick, Understanding the Securities Act, 24.
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to Otis as final were cleared by the Commission. The only relevance
of this to the Otis litigation,-beyond indicating the broad purpose of
the Act,-is the fact that the Commission did not avail itself of the
stop-order 'after its review of the Registration Statement and Prospectus. It is submitted, however, that a study of the record leads to
the conclusion that this action is almost completely negatived by (1)
the frequent attempts, overruled, of Otis to prove that the SEC bad
never received the full facts prior to the effective order and been deceived in the same manner as Otis itself, 120 (2) by the limitations on
the SEC's grant of power,121 (3) by its clear purpose not to act in approval of the accuracy and adequacy of the statement, 12 2 and (4) by
the handicaps of time and the absence of an audit or complete accounting picture of Kaiser-Frazer.
It is pertinent to note that the stop-order issues regardless of intent or knowledge in the issuer, but solely on the basis of a misrepresentation of a material fact and is issued in protection of the public
23
investor.

Civil Liability
Once the Registration Statement is effective and the Prospectus
is issued, the second set of sanctions comes into operation. Section 11
treats at length of the Registration Statement, and imposes civil liability for misrepresentation or non-disclosure on (1) the issuer, directors, principal officers, (2) accountants, and (3) underwriters.
Sec. 11. (a) In case any part of the registration statement, when such part
became effective, contained any untrue statement of a material fact, or omitted
to state a material fact ....
any person acquiring such security (unless it is
proved that at the time of such acquisition he knew of such untruth or omission) may . . . sue(I) every person who signed the registration statement;
(2) every person who was a director . . . or partner in, the issuer ...
(4) every accountant, engineer, or appraiser
(5) every underwriter . . .
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) no person, other than
the issuer, shall be liable . . . who shall sustain the burden of proofSee note 70 and body.
See note 69 and body.
122 Ibid.
123 A material concealment is a violation of this section without regard to wilfulness or intent. Unity Gold Corp., I S. E. C. 25, 29, 18 F. T. C. 649 (1934); Emporia Gold Mines, Inc., 2 S. E. C. 209, 221 (1937); Herman Hanson Oil Syndicate,
2 S. E. C. 743, 746 (1937); Kiwago Gold Mines, Ltd., Sec. Act Rel. 3278 (1948) 8.
120
121
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(3) that ...he had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to
believe, and did believe, at the time ...the registration statement became
effective, that the statements therein were true and that there was no omission
to state a material fact ....

In stating the liability of the various parties in this particular way the
Act does two things. It emphasizes the group duty of the venture to
the general investing public, and highlights the hierarchy of responsibility within that group. 124 "This proposal adds to the ancient rule
of caveat emptor the further doctrine 'let the seller also beware.' ",125
Section 12(2) complements in the matter of the Prospectus the
provisions of Section 11 relating to the Registration Statement and
imposes civil liability on the seller for damages or rescission. Any person who
...sells a security ...by means of a Prospectus or oral communication,
which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a
material fact ...(the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission),
and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in
the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or
omission ... shall be liable to the person purchasing such security ....

These two sections of the Act bear on the case indirectly, but nonetheless very effectively. They (1) set the stage for consideration of
the contract, which incorporates the Act into its terms, (2) tell forcibly what Kaiser-Frazer and the accountants would have faced in
the event of a consummated sale, (3) indicate what recovery Otis
could expect at law or equity, and (4) show what remedies would
lie in third party purchasers against Otis.
There can be little doubt that the Registration Statement, 'when it
became effective, contained a prospective violation of Section 11 (a).
This establishes a cause of action against Kaiser-Frazer in any person
acquiring the securities,-namely Otis and the public investors, provided there was no knowledge of the misrepresentation. This liability
on the issuer is absolute, with the one exception, the defense of knowledge in the buyer. With knowledge, therefore, there is no rcovery.
The accountants would face the same liability to Otis, but with
the added benefit of the provisions of Section 11 (b).
124 That the Act regards this as a group liability of all five categories vis-a-vis
the general public can further be understood by the provisions of Section 11 (f)
specifying contribution in the event of violation:
(f) All . . . persons ...shall be jointly and severally liable, and every person
who becomes liable to make any payment under this section may recover contribution .. .from any person, who, if sued separately, would have been liable. ...

125Roosevelt, Message to Congress, see note 118 supra.
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Thus the liability of Kaiser-Frazer is independent of the question of
intent to deceive or knowledge of the misrepresentation. This defense
is open to others than the issuer, but not to Kaiser-Frazer. It matters
not whether the misrepresentation was made in good faith, was an innocent clerical error, a mistake in judgment or a fully deliberate intent to deceive. All that is requisite is that it be a misrepresentation
or non-disclosure of a material fact. That the misrepresentation also
be misleading is not necessary. Thus the common law requisites have
been substantially altered.
Kaiser-Frazer would face a similar liability in regard to the Prospectus, with the added exception under Section 12(2) permitting
the defense of absence of knowledge of misrepresentation.
Consider next the result under Section 11 of a resale by Otis to
the public investor. In order to escape liability for damages or return
of the purchase price, Otis would have to show an absence of knowledge or misrepresentation or that it ". . . had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe . . . the statements therein were true . . ." And the investigation devolving on Otis under Section 11 (c) is that ". . . of a person occupying a fiduciary relationship." It is only in regard to the issuer that the liability is absolute.
Under Section 12(2) Otis would be subjected to the same liability
by use of the Prospectus, and would have to ". . . sustain the burden
of proof that it did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care
could not have known, of such untruth or omission."
If Otis actually had full knowledge of the misrepresentation, what
would result? The public investor buying without knowledge of the
misrepresentation would have a cause of action for rescission or return
of the purchase price and Otis would be liable under both Sections
II and 12(2).
Assume likewise that Otis was innocent of all knowledge at the effective date of the Registration Statement and the issuance of the Prospectus, but for the first time had reasonable belief of misrepresentation just prior to the closing. 2 ' Here Otis was in substantially the
same position as if it had the full knowledge from the beginning,
since it would be going ahead towards sale with a cogent conviction
of misrepresentation. This, de facto, is the position that Otis itself
alleges the record shows it had in the actual event. Since, as the event
itself proved, there was ample time in which to terminate the contract, return the money already collected from the public investors,
126 See note 115, supra.
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and restore all to the status quo ante, Otis, under this hypothesis,
would be consummating the sale with culpable knowledge if it completed the last details of the sale with the public by tender of the
stock. This would again result in liability in Otis to the innocent public purchaser.
Consider the other hypothesis that Otis had not full knowledge
but simply a mere suspicion of misrepresentation. What would be the
results of a sale to the public? The crux would be the extent of knowledge and investigation. Since the norm is that of a fiduciary, Otis
would be expected to follow up any suspicions and resolve any doubts
before proceeding.
Had Otis no knowledge from beginning to end there would have
been no liability at the hands of the public purchaser.
Criminal Liability
The final1 sanction under the Act comes in the anti-fraud provisions of Section 17(a) which impose a criminal liability on the
would-be-seller for any willful misrepresentation or non-disclosure
of a material fact:
27

Sec. 17. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the sale of any securities...
(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact ...
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.

There are provisions homologous12 to this section in the Mail Fraud

Statute'29 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.180
127 Section 14 warrants considerable discussion, but is more properly treated in
connection with the unenforceability of the contract. First see note 34 supra, for
the wording of the section, then infra in body.
128 For treatment of the interrelations of these various anti-fraud provisions, see
Loss, Securities Regulations, 811 et seq.
129 "Whoever having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or promises. . . ." 18 U. S .C. § 1341 (1948).
180 See Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Under this section the
Commission has promulgated Rule X-10B-5:
"Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices-It shall be unlawful for

any person ...
(1 to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material

fact...
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
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These sections carry great impact on the Otis case. Under paragraph (3) of Section 17 (a) Kaiser-Frazer might be said to be already
subject to criminal liability since it has long embarked on a ". . . transaction, practice or course of business which ...would operate as a
...deceit upon the purchaser." Here there is no need for the consummated sale. The filing of the Registration Statement and the use by
Otis of the Prospectus have set the "course of business" into operation.
Should Otis have effected a sale to the public the same criminal
liability of these sections would attach.
The reasoning applied under the civil liability provisions in connection with Otis' termination is, mutatis mutandis, relevant here.
Otis would have been acting in violation of a criminal statute were
it to have carried through the contract and sold to the public.
In regard to the intent of the seller under Section 17(a) reference
is had to Section 24 which is the criminal provision. In addition to
making it unlawful "willfully" to violate any section of the Act, Section 24 specifies the crime of "wilfully" making any untrue statement
in a registration statement. It would seem, therefore, that at least
knowledge of the falsity is required, if nothing further. This would
render the requirements under Section 17 (a) in the matter of knowledge in the seller practically identical to those under Section 12 (2)
and Section 11, except of course, that the liability of the issuer under
Section 11 is absolute.
The Securities Act in Otis
Preparatory to an analysis of the contract there are several reflective conclusions necessary for the proper perspective of the Securities
acts in the Otis case. It must be borne in mind that: (1) Otis, the
buyer, terminated before closing and left the burden of prosecution
with Kaiser-Frazer, the seller. (2) There was no actual sale. (3) Kaiser-Frazer was suing in contract for breach. (4) The only actions
under the Act are by buyer against seller after sale, except the stoporder which is not technically an action, and the criminal provisions,
which are unenforceable by Otis. (5) Otis had no cause of action
under the Act. (6) The Act offers no remedy for a failure to buy, or
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security."
The Securities Exchange Act carries the added section (29b) which renders void any
contract specifying performance which would involve violation of any provisions
of the act, or rules or regulations supplementing it. There is a second anti-fraud provision in the Securities Exchange Act:-Section 15 (c) (1) and Rule X-15C1-2 under it.

1/
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for seller against buyer. (7) Any violations of Sections 11 and 12 (2)
by Kaiser-Frazer were in a sense only in vacuo or in anticipation of
a sale to Otis. (8) The provisions actually violated by Kaiser-Frazer
were the anti-fraud Section 17 (a) and parallel sections.
This is why every hypothesis in the discussion of the Act was
premised on (1) a consummated sale (2) with the action by Otis
against Kaiser-Frazer or (3) by the public investor against Otis, since
there is no provision in the Act which would give Kaiser-Frazer an action against Otis, with or without a sale. The action had to be in
contract. Thus the only approach to the Securities acts is in reference
to the contract.
The next question to ask, once these verities are in mind, is: Are
the misrepresentations a defense for Otis? Can Otis, completely irrespective of the contract, block recovery by total reliance on the
Securities Act? The Act is posited on the assumption of a consummated sale and offers no defense to a suit for failure to sell, except
for the possible applicability of Section 14. The violations of KaiserFrazer might be such, when held up to Section 14, as to constitute a
valid defense. But this would be essentially a contractual ground, and
is the very subject to be treated in connection with the enforceability
of the contract.

(3) The Provisionsof the Contract
The contract did two very important things. (1) It doubly warranted that ". . . when the Registration Statement becomes effective,
the Registration Statement and the Prospectus will fully comply with
the provisions of the Act.. . and neither ... will contain any untrue
statement of a material fact nor omit to state any material fact ... "
(2) It made compliance with the warranty a condition to Otis' performance.
This warranty and this condition change the whole thrust of the
case. Up to this point the question was whether Otis could resort to
the Act as a defense, since there had been no actual sale. Now, two
marked changes have been effected: (1) The contract warranted
complete compliance with all the provisions of the Act. This converted the violation of the criminal provision of Section 17(a) and
the non-compliance with Sections 11 and 12 (2) into breaches of the
warranty, whereas under the Act alone they offered Otis little help.
The warranty merely specified non-compliance with any provision
of the Act, and did not require a consummated sale or a full cause of
action. (2) Even were no violations of the Act adduced, still the sim-
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pie warranty of truth and disclosure was sufficiently breached by
Kaiser-Frazer as to render unnecessary any resort to the Act.
The contract allows no exception for innocent mistake or absence
of knowledge. If there is a misrepresentation or non-disclosure of a
material fact there is a breach of the warranty.
Since compliance with these two warranties is a condition to performance, the moment the Registration Statement was declared effective by the SEC on February 3, 1948, Kaiser-Frazer was guilty of
a breach of both warranties through (1) specific violations of Sections 11, 12(2) and 17(a) of the Act, and (2) misrepresentation and
non-disclosure in the Registration Statement. This released Otis from
the obligation to purchase and exculpated it from any liability in terminating before the closing.
But all of this is true only if Otis can prove that it had no knowledge of the misrepresentation. Which brings the argument back to
the double hypothesis: (1) If Otis was innocent of all knowledge,
the case could rest at this point, since Otis would have a valid defense
in the breach of warranty, and Kaiser-Frazer could not counter with
estoppel or waiver due to knowledge."' (2) But if Otis cannot prove
innocence of knowledge, the argument must go forward on the assumption, ex arguendo, wrong as it may well be in fact, that Otis did
have full knowledge. If Otis can show a valid defense on this assumption '3 it has then succeeded in grasping both horns of the dilemma
and founded a cogent argument on both sides of the double hypothesis. Henceforward the assumption will be that Otis had full knowledge.
The Misrepresentation as Essential to the Venture
"... (3) and, as integral to the whole
underwriting agreement..."

From Part1:-Solution
"A buyer is estopped from later asserting unstated defenses of which he had
full knowledge at time of termination only where the seller, if notified, could have
cured the defects if he had been warned." Appellant's Reply Brief, 16, see note 36
supra. Land Oberoesterreich v. Gude, 109 F. 2d 635, 639 (C.A. 2d, 1940); Cawley
v. Weiner, 236 N.Y. 357, 140 N.E. 724 (1923); Peterburg Fire Brick & Tile Co. v.
American Clay Machinery Co., 89 Ohio St. 365, 106 N.E. 33 (1914); List & Son
Co. v. Chase, 80 Ohio St. 42, 88 N.E. 120 (1909); Frick Co. v. Baetzel, 71 Ohio
App. 301, 47 N.E. 2d 1019 (1942).
132The question of Otis' knowledge would be treated in one of two ways,
should later argumentation be found inadequate: (1) The case would be remanded
for fuller investigation into the question of fact, or, more reasonably, (2) the
evidence already adduced in support of the contention that Otis had konwledge
would be declared insufficient to bar the defense of the breach of the warranty.
131
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. There has been ample proof of a material and misleading misrepresentation in the Prospectus. The question now is: Does this misrepresented state of the earnings go to the heart of the total transaction?"' Or is it merely an, immaterial element that can be changed
without substantially affecting the contract? Does the intent of the
parties and the overall tenor of the venture permit substitution of a
different and downward trend of profits? Can the evil be expunged
as a collateral and accidental feature, or does it constitute the essence?
In other words: Was this income record so fundamental to the enterprise that its excision would basically alter the contract and pervert the original intent-in effect substitute an altogether different
agreement?
The intent of the parties was clear from the outset. First, Otis advised Kaiser-Frazer that a flotation would be impossible until it presented a better earnings record.' 3 ' Later, Kaiser-Frazer approached
Otis and stated that the profits were up and the summary would warrant the offering.' From beginning to end the question of income
was controlling in determining whether or not an issue could and
should be floated. (The state of the market determined 'when it would
be undertaken.) There is no doubt that Kaiser-Frazer and Otis had
no intention at all of proceeding if the earnings from operations
showed a downward instead of an upward trend, or admitted such
substantial padding from inventory write-ups. If the $4,000,000.00 had
been allocated to the prior months and not been shown in December,
Otis would never have agreed to the issue, nor would Kaiser-Frazer
133 To avoid a captious compounding of questions the assumption throughout
will be that the written contract adequately expressed the full intent of the parties
and that the purposes, spirit and intent of the toal underwriting venture are coterminous with the contract. The only cavil that might disturb this reasoning is

the question of whether the rather than a Prospectus was incorporated into the
contract. Here the intent was clear. The Registration Statement and Prospectus
had been prepared, were fully ready for filing and were sent off to the SEC
within a few hours, if not minutes, after the signing of the contract. There is no
doubt but that this Prospectus was the one incorporated into the contract, and
not a Prospectus. Should this still not be clear, in and of itself, and perfectly within
the four corners, as Williston says: "The intent may be inadequately expressed,
but the language of the writing . . . nevertheless indicates the intent by the general
tenor and purpose of the contract if taken in connection with surrounding circumstances." Williston, Contracts § 610 et seq. (Rev. Ed. 1938). The reasons adduced
in the body to show that the misrepresentation was integral to the contract and
the venture will at the same time prove that the written contract and the general
venture can be spoken of interchangeably.
184R., IlI, 1386-87:

IV,

2012-13.

135 R., TIT, 1388-89.
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have proposed it. Otis an& Kaiser-Frazer did not first agree to buy
and sell under any conditions, and then later look at the income. They
finally agreed to the issue because and on the necessary stipulation
that the profit trend published in the Prospectus was such as there
represented. Both parties realized that no public issue could be attempted without the favorable income graph in the Prospectus." 6
All this the contract bore out. Truth was a condition to performance, and especially truth in the matter of the financial state of the
firm. Kaiser-Frazer gave the specific warranty that ". . . there has
been no substantial adverse change in the condition, financial or
otherwise, of the Company . . ."I"
In short, the figures as misrepresented were a necessary element of
the undertaking. They were intrinsic to the agreement. Change them
and the contract changed. Excision of the misrepresented fact would
change the essence of the agreement.
The Rights of the Investing Public
"... (4) and essentially looking
to the detriment of the public
investor ..."
From Part 1:-Solution

At this point there must be a complete shift in emphasis. In the
preceding considerations the outlook was that of Otis as a litigant in
an action by Kaiser-Frazer. This point of view will perdure, but in a
definitely second place. Now it will become more clear why such
meticulous care was expended in indicating the more important relationship of the entire Kaiser-Frazer-Otis underwriting venture to
the general investing public. Henceforward the viewpoint is that of
the third party investor. The master key to this Otis case lies in the
protection of the rights of the public. Whether Kaiser-Frazer or Otis
is successful in the instant litigation is secondary. It should be understood that Otis does not win, nor Kaiser-Frazer lose. What in truth
happens is that the public investor wins, and both Kaiser-Frazer and
Otis are simply told that they, and their accountants and brokers, are
to stop the flotation, that their contract is illegal, that as illegal it is
unenforceable,-unenforceable by any party, Kaiser-Frazer, or even
136 "The Prospectus, which has been found to have been misleading, formed an
integral part of the contract and the public sale of the stock by the underwriter
was to be made and could only have been made in reliance on that prospectus."
Kaiser-Frazer v. Otis & Co., 195 F. 2d 838, 844 (C.A. 2d, 1952).
137 Section I(e) of the Contract, R., I, 15. See also Section 1(f) of the Contract,
supra note 10.
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Otis, should Otis seek enforcement. Thus, in protecting the third
party investor the adjudication merely lets the chips fall where they
may, and it happens per accidens that Kaiser-Frazer does not retrieve
its desired $3,000,000.00, nor does Otis have to pay it. In this sense,
Otis wins and Kaiser-Frazer loses, but that is inaccurate terminology,
for the adjudication is merely leaving the parties in status quo in
protecting the general investing public. As soon as the Otis case moves
into this area of consideration the equities of the two parties, KaiserFrazer and Otis, are no longer in forefront. Now the emphasis is on
the third party public.
At this point the question is: Does the misrepresentation in the
Prospectus stop with Otis, or carry over inevitably to the public?
Was this an isolated operation between two parties, or does it look
exclusively to a public sale? Was the public sale also intrinsic to the
contract? An essential stipulation?
Three general areas of inquiry indicate that the Kaiser-Frazer-Otis
transaction was not a private bargain but envisaged a public offering:
(1) the traditional mechanics of the flotation, (2) the nature of the
agreement, (3) the terms of the contract.
Kaiser-Frazer and Otis had agreed to a form and procedure of
underwriting that was not substantially different1 3 from the traditional "firm commitment" type in common use in such flotations.
This method involves several steps all leading to a sale to the general
public immediately upon the signing of the contract. Kaiser-Frazer
was to, and did, prepare, sign and file the Registration Statement with
the SEC. The actual issue began on the morning following the effective order. Kaiser-Frazer sent out the Prospectus to the selling group
for public use. The sale itself was well under way and the stock half
sold when Otis terminated. From beginning to end everything in the
venture followed the established customs and practices leading only
to one culmination: a sale to the public investor.'31
The nature of the transaction and the intent of the parties point
to a public sale and nothing else. From the outset, second only to the
13 8

The deal did have its own peculiar variation. The original firm commitment

for 1,500,000 shares was changed to 900,000 "firm" and the remaining on an option
basis at a higher price. Rider to Prospectus, page 1.
189The Circuit Court understood this when it stated: "We cannot blind our-

selves to the fact that the sale of this stock by Kaiser-Frazer, though, in so far as
the particular contract was concerned, was a sale only to the underwriters, was

but the initial step in the public offering of the securities which would necessarily
follow." Kaiser-Frazer v. Otis & Co., 195 F. 2d 838, 844 (C.A. 2d, 1952).
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concern over Kaiser-Frazer's earning record (which in itself meant
nothing if it were not to be used in encouraging public purchase),
was the worry over the market price. The issue was held upon prior
occasions due to a poor market and when actually begun the issue
required an immediate distribution in order to capitalize on the current market price. Otis had neither the intent nor the capital to retain
the shares, but had floated a one-day loan with which to effect the
transaction at the closing.
The terms of the w:ritten contract establish further the intent of all
in the enterprise. The price, published prominently on the first page
of the Prospectus, was based on the market, and listed the separate
figures for the selling group and the public. Kaiser-Frazer itself agreed
to stabilize the market in preparation for the public sale. The contract specified that Kaizer-Frazer was to supply as many copies of
the Prospectus to securities dealers ". . . as may be required for use
in connection with the public offering of the Shares."' 140 Finally, the
warranties, as conditions, became binding, "When the Registration
Statement becomes effective . . ." indicating complete preparation for
immediate public vending. In incorporating the provisions of the Securities Act into the contract Kaiser-Frazer further warranted that
the venture would pursue the basic purposes of the Act in protection
of the public investor.
The intent of the parties included a sale to the public as intrinsic
to the contract, an essential element of the agreement.
If a venture leads inevitably to a public sale based on a material
misrepresentation, integral to the whole enterprise, that sale will likewise inevitably lead to a violation of the rights of the investor and
to his material detriment. This is probably one of the most important
concepts in the Otis case, because if an inseverable nexus is not established with the innocent public, the later reasoning will fail.
The Enforceability of the Contract
"... (5) rendered the Contract
illegal, and hence unenforceable . . ."
From Part l:-Solution

The denouement in the analysis of Otis comes in the application
of the general rule against enforcement of contracts which essentially
look to the performance of illegal acts. Williston calls them "Corrupt
140

Section 2(d) and (f) of the Contract, R., 1, 17.
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or Immoral Bargains," and among the various types and subdivisions
he lists those in violation of the rights of innocent third parties. He
states the rule thus:
In general a bargain which contemplates a wrong to a third person, or to
undefined members of the public, whether trespass, breach of trust, or fraud,
is illegal.141

To this, Williston adds a further specification more pertinent to the

instant investigation:
A bargain to refrain from disclosing to a third person to whom142a duty of
disclosure exists, information of value or interest to him, is illegal.

These principles, joined to the" considered reflections already presented, indicate the five elements of the particular rule specifically
applicable to the facts in Otis: A bargain is illegal which contains (1)
a misrepresentation or non-disclosure, (2) integral to the agreement,
(3) inevitably looking to, (4) harm or detriment; (5) to innocent
third parties.
The basic reason why such bargains are unenforceable is the evil
inevitable in their performance. To avoid this evil the courts cannot
permit enforcement. Could the evil, here the harm to the innocent,
be obviated in any other way, the courts would not be forced to
declare the contract either invalid or illicit. The law must protect
itself. An agreement to violate the law is a violation of the law.
This introduces a dialectical point of some nicety. If the two elements of integrality and inseverable relation of the falsity to the
public are not posited as intrinsic to the essence of the contract, but
merely as necessary conditions sine quibus non (which is the least
they can be) and outside the four corners of the contract but necessary to it, the contract could conceivably be said to be "valid on its
face." If, however, as has been here affirmed throughout, these elements are substantial and integral parts within the four corners, fully
incorporated into it, the contract is not "valid on its face," but is
in se corrupt and immoral, as having falsity inherently constituting
its essence, and is, therefore, not only illicit, but invalid. In the former supposition the contract would be only illicit, but not invalid.
The one is only per accidens corrupt, the other in se. The practical
effects in Otis are the same, since both types of contract are illegal,
and hence unenforceable, and the same proofs must be adduced in
Contracts. S 1738, page 4912 (Rev. Ed., 1938).
at 4914, with cases cited.

141Williston,

142 Ibid.,
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each instance, since, either as necessary conditions or intrinsic elements, both integrality and inevitable perduration must necessarily
be present.
Materne v. Horwitz
An early New York case states the rule in Otis with almost primitive simplicity. Materne agreed (1) to sell Horwitz low-grade sardines and (2) to supply a batch of "high-grade" labels. At the time
of the agreement Horwitz knew what type sardines he was going
to get, and Materne knew he understood this. Mateme also knew
that Horwitz entered the contract with the purpose of selling the
sardines exactly as received. "It is also evident that the labels were
used to deceive the consumers and not the contractors, and to obtain higher prices for the sardines." At this point Horwitz terminated. Materne sued for breach. The court held:
It is, therefore, apparent that it was part of the contract that an unlawful
object was intended, of which both parties were cognizant, and that it was
designed by them, under the contract, to commit a fraud and thus promote
an illegal purpose by deceiving other parties. In such a case the courts will
not aid either party in carrying out a fraudulent purpose.
To carry out this contract would be contrary to public policy, and in such
143
a case, as we have seen, the court will not aid either party.

The parity with Otis is paten. The principle of the Materne case
lies at the base of the reasoning of the Circuit Court'44 when it says:
..we are satisfied that the contract was so closely related to the
143 Materne v. Horwitz, 101 N.Y. 469, 471, 5 N.E. 331, 332 (1886).
144 It seems otiose to enter a discussion concerning the applicability of Section
14 as a statutory provision voiding contracts contrary to the policy of the Act.
The Court of Appeals sought, in a footnote (see supra note 34 and body), some
support from the section, but Kaiser-Frazer alleged that it did not apply, according
to legislative intent, and adduced the Securities Exchange Act in proof. The '34
Act, asserted Kaiser-Frazer, had the exactly homologous provision of Section 14 in
Section 29(a), but also had the additional Section 29(b). Whereas Section 14 and
Section 29(a) rendered void only those contracts which had a "condition, stipulation or provision" which waived compliance with the Act, Section 29(b) rendered
void any contract the performance of which would involve a violation of any
provisions of the Act or of any rule or regulation thereunder. See note 130 supra.
The argument was that there was no such condition, stipulation or provision in the
instant contract, and that if Congress had wanted a voiding clause for simple noncompliance under the '33 Act it would have added a homologue to Section 29(b),
since both the '34 Act and notable amendment of the '33 Act were passed at the
same time. Discussion of this is unnecessary for two reasons: (1) the general
contract principle against corrupt and immoral contracts is controlling, and (2)
the misrepresentation violated the '34 Act as well and the voiding clause there
would apply.

DE PAUL LAW REVIEW

performance of acts forbidden by law as to be itself illegal.' 1 45 In
short, both contracts, in Materne and Otis, have an essential relation
to the performance of illegal acts. These acts the respective courts
cannot countenance and the only means available for preventing
them is a declaration of unenforceability. In both cases, moreover,
the envisaged evil is internal to the agreement and infallibly related
to the harm of the innocent public. The New York court stresses
these points when it says that "an unlawful object" was "part of the
contract," and the deception of the public was contemplated "under
the contract." These fill out the five requisites of the rule against
enforcement. Since all are intrinsic to the essence, not merely conditions sine quibus non, both contracts are not only illicit but invalid
ab initio and hence unenforceable.
The Frost Case
Kaiser-Frazer, of.course, would not directly dispute this general
principle of contract law. It rather did two things; it ignored it as a
broad contractual principle over and above the Securities Act, and
it endeavored to shift the entire force of the rule into exclusively
Securities Act channels, where it was clearly not meant to be, either
by the Court of Appeals or Otis. Once the argument was diverted
into a question of unenforceability under the Securities Act, KaiserFrazer cited A. G. Frost & Co. v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp. 4 '
with which the Otis "... decision is in direct conflict."'' 47 The Frost
opinion is admirably suited to highlight the distinctions thus far delineated.
The contract involved in the Frost case was between underwriter
and issuer for shares of stock. Midway during performance the contract was terminated and liability denied on the ground that the
contract "was entered into in violation of law, and particularly ...
the Securities Act . .."4s The contract was fully legal and valid on
its face. In the process of performance, however, the issuer failed to
145 195 F. 2d 838, 844 (C.A. 2d, 1952). Thus the Court does not specify whether
the relation that the contract has "to the performance of acts forbidden by law"
is one of a condition sine qua non or of intrinsic essence, since it does not matter
in this adjudication which it is, as long as the relation to the future performance is
necessary and indisputable. It is here submitted that the relation is intrinsic to the
essence.
140312 U.S. 38 (1941).
147 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra at note 54, at page 8.
148 Frost v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38, 39 (1941).
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register the stock with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
There was no other irregularity involved. There was no harm inuring to the public, no fraud, no misrepresentation nor non-disclosure. The Supreme Court of the United States noted that "the challenged contract bears no evidence of criminality and is fair upon its
It then cited the broad purpose of the Act:
The essential purpose of the statute is to protect investors by requiring
of certain information concerning securities before offered for
publication
0
sale.15

face

.

..

"9

To this purpose the Supreme Court added the general rule against
the enforcement of corrupt contracts by saying: ". . . contracts in
contravention of public policy are not enforceable . . ." This prin-

ciple "should be applied with caution and only in cases plainly
within the reasons on which that doctrine rests. It is only because
of the dominant public interest

. . ."I'

Finally, in one paragraph the

Supreme Court makes the controlling distinction between contracts
which have no essential relation to harm to the innocent and those
which are accidentally and extrinsically illicit.
The protean basis underlying this doctrine has been stated thus-No one
can lawfully do that which tends to injure the public or is detrimental to the
public good. If it definitely appears that enforcement of a contract will not
at least, what the parties have
be followed by injurious results, generally,
52
agreed to ought not to be struck down.

The Supreme Court in the Frost case, contrary to the KaiserFrazer allegations, has enunciated exactly the general rule applicable
to the Otis case and has equally exactly distinguished its application
to the facts in Frost. Consider the five elements of the rule. In Frost
(1) There was no misrepresentation, no falsity or evil of any kind.
There was only the violation of the positive-law enactment. (2)
Whatever evil could be attributed to the non-registration was not integral to the agreement in any way, but was an extrinsic factor that in
no way would influence or change the contract were it cured, i.e., by
registration. (3) This same non-registration, in and of itself, did not
have an inseverable relation to the harm or detriment of innocent
third parties, or as the Court expressed it, tend "to injure the public." Of the five elements none but the first was present.
Kaiser-Frazer impugns the stand of the Circuit Court and claims
Ibid., at 42.
150 Ibid., at 40.

149

151 Ibid., at 44.

152

Ibid.

188

DE PAUL LAW REVIEW

that it "did not cite but apparently ignored the' ' 153 Frost case. There
is a very strong rebuttal of this allegation in the case of Judson v.
Buckley.1 4 The Judson case, moreover, carries forward the delicate
reasoning developed in connection with the application of the rule
against enforcement of corrupt contracts. In the Judson case, two
of the same three judges considered the case as sat in the Otis case,
Augustus N. Hand and Clark. Judge Hand wrote both Otis and
Judson. Since the Judson case is an a fortiori application of the rule,
there is little difficulty in asserting that Judge Hand would not have
held differently had he seen the Frost opinion. In short, there is no
reason at all to assume he did not see it.
In the Judson case there was an actual misrepresentation in the
prospectus. The question then in Judson was: Did this lie perdure to the
harm of the public, and was it an integral and essential element of
the contract? The lie was a misrepresentation of the true ownership
of the securities offered for sale. The question again was of enforcement of a contract. The Court, by Judge Hand, held that this misrepresentation could not "mislead prospective purchasers as to the
value of the stock or really prejudice them in any way" and "the
public offense" committed was therefore "one of little practical significance."' 5 5 Therefore there was no reason to block enforcement
of the contract. This is certainly a stronger case for non-enforcement than the Frost facts. In Judson there was a lie involved. Certainly
if Judge Hand wrote Judson he would write Frost. But if he would
write Judson and still write Otis, the distinctions are admirably
highlighted and the very important differences between the presence and absence of the five elements of the rule are engraved
deeply in the three opinions.
In Judson there was a falsity, but it was not integral to the agreement (since it mattered little to the value of the shares who owned
them-) and it did not inevitably look to the harm of the public (it
could have been cured, and there was no harm if it were not).
The Rule Applied in Otis
Some brief speculation on the various possible results attendant
on a sale by Otis to the public will illustrate the inherent reason153 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra at note 54, at page 8.
154 130 F. 2d 174 (C.A. 2d, 1942) cert. denied, Buckley v. Judson, 317 U.S. 679
(1942).
155 Ibid., at 179.
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ableness of the rule against enforcement. The rule in principle is
clear. When applied to all the hypotheses and possibilities it is pellucid. The assumption continues that Otis had full knowledge at the
closing.
If Otis were to buy from Kaiser-Frazer and resell to the public,
a cause of action for damages or rescission would immediately arise
in the innocent purchaser against both Kaiser-Frazer and Otis. Thus
Otis, by the sale, would at the same time harm innocent buyers and
subject itself to a suit for damages or rescission. The law cannot
knowingly let anyone proceed in a course of action that will harm
the innocent. Nor could Otis be legally allowed to perform an act
illegal in itself or for which it would be legally liable in a suit by
investors. Termination, therefore, was the only course, both in protection of Otis from litigation and of the public investor from deception and detriment.
If Otis had anything less than full knowledge, say a suspicion of
the true facts, Otis would still be expected to terminate rather than
risk the burden of an illegal sale to the public investor and the onus
of a litigation in which it would have to prove a reasonable investigation begun on the basis of the suspicion. Even the possibility of
damages or rescission under such conditions would indicate termination. To go ahead in the face of this suspicion would also be in
derogation of the rights of the public investor especially when they
were entrusted to Otis as to a fiduciary, as specified in the Act.
Had there been termination for reasons completely foreign to
knowledge of misrepresentation, Otis would be allowed any defense
to its action that the facts would support, and hence any later discovered evidence of misrepresentation could, and should be, adduced
in support of the termination.
Were Kaizer-Frazer, on the other hand, permitted to recover in
the instant action, the amount of the judgment would be in effect
the very money or its equivalent that the sale would have deceptively extorted from the public on the basis of the misrepresentation. If Otis were forced to pay Kaiser-Frazer, it would be for refusing to deceive the innocent public and subject itself to an action
for damages or rescission.
Viewed in another way this would be a suit between two who
both knowingly set out to deceive the public. It would be inpossible to award damages to one such deceiver because the other refused to go through with the deception.
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The Question of Estoppel
".... (6) and notwithstanding
alleged estoppel due to Otis'
knowledge."
From Part 11: Solution
Continuing the assumption that Otis had full knowledge of the
misrepresentation Kaiser-Frazer averred that Otis was estopped from
claiming breach of warranty. Were it true that the contract was a
private bargain, isolated from the future deception of the innocent
investor, and that the future deception was not an intrinsic element
of the agreement-which is an assumption contrary to the facts and
hence supposes a contract and a state of affairs altogether different
from the instant considerations-then, as between Kaizer-Frazer and
Otis only, Otis could not adduce the breach of the warranty of fulldisclosure. But in that supposition the contract would not be the contract that has been so closely analyzed thus far. It would involve a
sale of stock to Otis, with no thought of a future re-sale to the public.
If that were the case there would be no need to worry about the protection of the investor, because no investor was, or would be, contemplated.
So, in fact, if Otis had to rely on the breach of warranty in order
to bar recovery by Kaiser-Frazer, it would be a totally different
matter. Otis relies on the breach of warranty only on the other half
of the double hypothesis, namely, if it did not have knowledge. If it
did not have knowledge, the breach of the warranty would bar the
action of Kaiser-Frazer, and no estoppel would prohibit Otis from
claiming it.
But once Otis shifts, ex arguendo, to the assumption that it did
have knowledge, it must, perforce, forget about the warranty. The
burden henceforward for proving unenforceability is the fact that
the misrepresentation is integral to the contract and that it has an
inevitable relation to the innocent public. This does not mean that
Otis could not and does not and should not found its case on this
point, even if it could prove that it did not have knowledge at tile
time of the signing or even closing, since then it would have an
a fortiori case in that the recovery of Kaizer-Frazer would be barred
for two reasons, (1) breach of warranty of truth in relation to Otis
and (2) the intrinsic unenforceability of a corrupt contract aimed at
harm to the innocent. Merely because Otis did not have knowledge
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of such a contract does not make it any the less corrupt if it had only
one purpose, the deception of the investor. Otis could have been the
unwitting tool in a sale to the public. The five elements of the definition of a corrupt contract would be verified irrespective of Otis'
knowledge.
Thus at this stage of the reasoning the question of the warranty
has been disposed of, and consequently the concomitant question of
the estoppel from claiming breach of that warranty. In one phrase,
Otis' knowledge simply does not enter into the question at this point,
other than to make Otis more able to terminate rather than carry
through unwittingly, and unknowingly to deceive the public. The
only question now is whether the contract is intrinsically vitiated. If
so, it cannot be enforced. To say that Otis is estopped, is missing the
point. In this argument Otis is in fact not claiming anything for itself.
If it had knowledge it would be estopped from claiming anything of
benefit to itself. It is merely now calling the court's attention to the
rights of the innocent third party, and telling the court that it could
not go ahead with the arrangement because it would have jeopardized
those rights and incidentally subjected itself to suit by the injured
purchasers. The question therefore is beyond the equities of the parties. As the Circuit Court said: "This is so regardless of the equities
of the parties for ... the very meaning of public policy is the interest
of others than the parties and that interest is not to be at the mercy
of the defendant alone."' 5 6
Therefore this contract is declared invalid for two reasons: (1)
It is inherently evil, in that it stipulates in its essence a deception, and
(2) it is harnful of the innocent. Thus it would be unenforceable
either simply to eliminate the evil or to protect the innocent. If two
agree to a murder the contract is invalid for two reasons, first because
evil cannot be legally enforceable, and second the victim must be
saved. Therefore no matter what Otis knew or did not know about
the evil, the contract was invalid. Merely to say, "I know about the
misrepresentation, go ahead and deceive the public," hardly renders
the contract valid. It is really a misconception to think that estoppel
plays any part in this argument at all. Estoppel bars personal claims
of Otis, but cannot stop.the court's recognition of the intrinsic immorality of a contract or the danger to the innocent simply because
Otis happens per accidens to benefit by a declaration, of the court
in protection of the rights of the public investor.
156 195 F. 2d 838, 844 (C.A. 2d, 1952).
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A further very refined point in this matter of estoppel might be
discussed. There is another way of saying that the whole question of
estoppel is not relevant here. It is this. Because one of the intrinsic
elements of the instant contract, and all such corrupt contracts where
the evil is inherent to the essence of the contract and hence inevitable
in its performance, is harm to the innocent public, the very supposition is that this harm is based on absence of knowledge in the purchaser. Thus, it is true to say that the question of estoppel is irrelevant if we mean the estoppel of the second party contractor (since
he is not really making the claim of injury) but not if we mean the
estoppel of the third party purchaser,since he is not absolutely barred
fromthe rule of estoppel, if in a de facto case, such a sale were made
and such a purchaser did have knowledge. But that again would be a
contrary-to-fact supposition, since the very rule posits an "innocent"
purchaser. The supposition is, and rightly so, that none of the public
will have knowledge since the instrument is necessarily deceptive. By
such suppositions the "intrinsic" evil is being removed from the contract. (But this is not true of all contracts that are invalid through
evil intrinsic to their essence, since some cannot have the evil cured
even by knowledge or consent, e.g., a contract to statutory rape. In
such contracts, estoppel, in truth, never applies.) So it still stands
that the question of estoppel is foreign to any discussion of the unenforceability of corrupt contracts.
This is the Otis case. Seen in its proper perspective it can teach us
much. Beyond the superficialities, the eye-catching and emotionstirring details-the unusual termination, the NASD suspension, the
Masterson squabble, the SEC investigations, the Heller inquiries, even
beyond the fascinating factual convolutions and ramifications, beyond
all this there lies one single and outstanding feature of Otis that repays all this lengthy analysis. Otis is a vindication of our American
philosophy of life and law. Every force in Otis propelled the Court
to a decision of expediency, to a pragmatic nod of approval that
would have been a kowtow to a hasty public opinion, to an understandable reaction to the questionable conduct of Otis throughout
the venture, even to the status quo set up by a strong lower court
opinion. In face of all this the Court stood firm and relied on the
sound moral philosophy at the base of our law, and went behind
statutes and contract alike to the fundamental natural-law principle
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of the unenforceability of contracts in derogation and injury of the
rights of the innocent and unprotected public investor. This action
is more important than the capable handling of the complexity of the
facts, even more important than the reaffirmation of the inviolability
of the disclosure provisions of the Securities Acts, and strengthens
our faith in our fundamental law and the American system of courts
and justice.

